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THE HOBBESIAN CONSTITUTION: GOVERNING
WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman"

One case in American legal history, perhaps more than any other,
starkly presents in a single package many of the most fundamental issues of

American structural constitutionalism: the principle of enumerated powers,
the concept of limited government, and the place of the United States in a

world of sovereign nations. It raises foundational questions about the powers of all major institutions of the national government and serves as an

ideal acid test for differing conceptions of the Constitution-and indeed of
the American nation-state.

In terms of its theoretical scope and conse-

quences, it is one of the most important cases ever decided by the United

States Supreme Court. The case is Cross v. Harrison.'
If you have never heard of Cross v. Harrison, you are in good com-

pany. The case is not even cited in the two leading treatises on constitutional law.2 It does not appear in the Table of Cases of any of the eight
Constitutional Law casebooks that we surveyed. No modem law review
article of which we are aware makes any significant use of Cross; the rela-

tively few articles that mention Cross primarily cite it, often as part of a

" Professor, Boston University School of Law. Part of this Article was prepared while I was a professor at Northwestern University School of Law. I am profoundly grateful to both institutions for their
support on this project.

Lecturer, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel.
57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1854).
2 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1999); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d cd.2000).
3 See JEROME A. BARRON, C. THOMAS DIENES, VAYNE MCCORMACK & MARTIN H. REDISH,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY (4th ed. 1992); PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEViNSON,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (3d ed. 1992); DANIEL A. FARBER, WILUIM N.
ESKRDIGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TIEMES FOR THE CONSTITION'S THIRD
CENTURY (2d ed. 1998); GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTItmONAL LAW (13th
ed. 1997); DOUGLAS NV. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE AMIEJCAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
(1998); WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, YALE KAMISAR, JESSE H. CHOPER, STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1996); WILLIAM B. LOCKIART, YALE
KAMISAR, JESSE H. CHOPER, STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., CONSTIUTIO,,AL LAW
(8th ed. 1996); GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK L TUSHNET,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996).
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string-citation, for very general propositions of law.4 Indeed, it is fair to describe Cross v. Harrison as "obscure."

Nonetheless, our description of its theoretical significance is not hyperbole. Cross involved the legality of the American government in California between May 30, 1848, when the United States acquired the territory,
and September 9, 1850, when California was admitted as a state. 5 During
that almost two-and-one-half year period, the American territory of California was "governed" by military authorities who acted without any statutory
authorization from Congress. The Supreme Court in Cross upheld the constitutionality of this peculiar arrangement. The case raises fundamental
questions about the powers of the principal institutions of the national government in times of war and peace-and about the constitutional line be4 We have found 24 articles in the WESTLAW and LEXIS databases that cite Cross v. Harrison.
One of those articles was written by one of the present authors. See Gary Lawson, TerritorialGovernments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 906 n.322 (1990). One author is very much
aware of the events surrounding Cross but does not focus on their constitutional significance. See Myra
K. Saunders, CaliforniaLegal History: The Legal System Under the United States Military Government,
1846-1849, 88 LAW LBR. J. 488 (1996). Twenty-two of the articles simply cite Cross, without any substantive discussion, for general propositions of law. See Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood
Henderson, Contrary Jurisprudence: Tribal Interests in Navigable Waterivays Before and After Montana v. United States, 56 WASH. L. REV. 627 (1981); David J. Bederman, ExtraterritorialDomicile and
the Constitution, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 451 (1988); Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionalityof the War
Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REv. 101 (1984); Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials:
A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13 (1990); Robert N. Clinton, OriginalUnderstanding,
Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987); David P.
Currie, The Constitutionin the Supreme Court: Article IV and FederalPowers, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 695; David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Full Faith and the Bill of Rights,
1889-1910, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 867 (1985); Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews ofUncle Sam: The History, Evolution, and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667
(1995); L. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Institution: The Separation of Propertyfront
Sovereignty in InternationalLaw, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 263 (1997); David M. Golove, Against FreeForm Formalism,73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998); Sedgwick W. Green, Applicability of American Laws
to Overseas Areas Controlled by the United States, 68 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1955); Captain Timothy
Guiden, Defending America's Cambodian Incursion, 11 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215 (1994); Deborah D. Herrera, Unincorporatedand Exploited: Differential Treatmentfor Trust Territory ClaimantsWhy Doesn't the ConstitutionFollow the Flag?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 593 (1992); Karl Manheim
& Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1165 (1998); Major Scott R. Morris, The Laws of War: Rules by Warriorsfor Warriors, 1997 ARMY
LAW. 4; Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991); Major Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction Over Foreign Nationals Who Commnil hIternational
Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Constructionof American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996); Captain Annamary Sullivan,
The President'sPower to PromulgateDeath Penalty Standards, 125 MIL. L. REV. 143 (1989); Roger
M. Sullivan, The Power of Congress Under the Property Clause: A Potential Check on the Effect of the
Chadha Decision on Public Land Legislation, 6 PUB. LAND L. REV. 65 (1985); David L. Roland, Case
Note, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1085 (1986); Paul S. Rosenzweig, Comment, Functional Equivalents ofthe
Border,Sovereignty, and the FourthAmendment, 52 U. CHi. L. REV. 119 (1985).
5 As we shall see, the facts of the case formally concerned a time period that ended approximately
one year before California attained statehood, but the broad issues raised by the case implicate events up
to September 9, 1850, the date of California's admission to the Union.
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tween wartime and peacetime governance-that go to the very heart of the
American constitutional enterprise. And although the Supreme Court has
relied on Cross on only a few occasions, those sparing uses have had significant consequences.
A full treatment of the legal, political, and historical significance of
Cross would require a book.7 Our goal in this Article is more modest. We
hope to introduce Cross to the mainstream of American constitutional discourse and to begin a dialogue on at least some of the many questions that
are embedded in its facts. Part I presents a brief description of the facts and
background of Cross and a quick introduction to some of the legal issues
that it raises. Part II explains why certain modem doctrines of official immunity and de facto governmental authorization that contemporary lawyers
would find critical to the disposition of a case like Cross played no
role-and properly played no role-in the case when Cross was decided in
1854.8 Part III critically examines the Supreme Court's disposition of
Cross, with a special focus on some important issues that lurk in the background but that were either ignored or cavalierly cast aside by the Court's
decision. In particular, Part III considers some very basic questions about
the nature of sovereignty, the meaning of a constitution of limited and enumerated powers, and the relationship between congressional and presidential
powers during and immediately after wartime. We identify the startling, and
in many respects Hobbesian, 9 claims of power that were asserted and ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in Cross. We then trace some of the
consequences of those claims in subsequent legal and political events, most
notably the so-called InsularCases, which concerned the constitutional status
of Pacific and Caribbean territories acquired by the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Part IV contains concluding remarks.
Even if the reader does not ultimately share our assessment of Cross's
importance, we trust that the reader will find the journey upon which it carries us to be enlightening, thought-provoking, and troubling. Few cases tell
us as much about the true meaning of the American constitutional order.

6 See infra section III.D4.
7 We are planning such a book. Of course, one of the present authors has been planning this Article

since 1990, see Lawson, supra note 4, at 906 n.322, so don't hold your breath.
8 Our approach in this Article is explicitly originalist. That identification, ofcourse, raises as many

questions as it answers. Because, however, to date there is no source that rigorously describes the mechanics of the kind of methodology that we employ, we must leave the description of our methodology

at an uninformative level of generality. For some preliminary thoughts that outline the general direction
of our approach, see Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, 7The President'sPower to Exccute the
Laws, 104 YALE LJ. 541, 550-59 (1994); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes... and Constitutions, 86

GEo. L. REV. 1823 (1997).
9 We use the term "Hobbesian" in a metaphorical rather than strictly historical sense to refer to theories
that use claims of necessity and implied consent tojustify sovereign authority outside of formal legal limits.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Cross v. Harrisonwas a suit brought by Cross, Hobson & Co., a trading firm, against Edward H. Harrison, a federal customs collector in California, for the recovery of tariff duties collected by Harrison between February
3, 1848 and November 12, 1849. The plaintiffs claimed that Harrison had no
legal authority to collect the tariffs during all or part of that time. To understand the basis for the suit, one must understand the relevant chronology of
events in California and the significance of Harrison's peculiar status.
On May 13, 1846, the United States Congress declared war on Mexico.
Shortly thereafter, American forces occupied the territory now known as
California. By July 1846, American military commanders were proclaim10
ing California as United States territory by virtue of military occupation.
Under universally accepted principles of international law, the successful occupation entitled the United States to set up a provisional military
government in California." In early 1847, President Polk instructed the
military commanders in California to establish such a government and to
collect duties on goods imported into California. 2 It is important to recognize that these "duties" are not the kind of duties referenced in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution1 3 or other constitutional clauses that
discuss or limit the power to lay duties.' 4 Wartime "duties" imposed in occupied territory are military exactions that are (within the limitations of international law) just as much a part of the war effort as the bombing of
enemy positions. Their domestic constitutional authorization does not stem
from the congressional taxing power in Article I but from the grant to the
President in Article II of the power to act as "Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States ... ."" The
commander-in-chief power clearly entails the power to wage war in accor1o For an eminently readable discussion of the events leading up to and during the MexicanAmerican War, see PAUL H. BERGERON, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES K. POLK 65-113 (1987).
11 This uncontroversial principle had been repeatedly recognized by the Court prior to the decision
in Cross v. Harrison. See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828);
United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819). Indeed, if the institutions in the occupied territory
were sufficiently displaced by the conquest, international law probably obliged the conqueror to provide
a government for the occupied territory.
12 See Letter from W.L. Marcy, Secretary of War, to Brigadier General S.W. Kearny or officer of
the U.S. Army highest in rank in California, Mexico (Jan. 1I,1847), reprintedin S. Doc. No. 31-18, at
242-46 (1850).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.
I ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.").
14 Id. at art. I, § 9, cl.
5 (prohibiting federal duties from being laid on exports from states); id. (prohibiting States from laying duties on vessels traveling from one state to another); id. at art. 1,§ 10, cls. 23 (prohibiting the State, without congressional consent, from imposing duties except as "absolutely
necessary" for executing inspection laws or in case of actual imminent invasion).
15 Id. at art. In,
§ 2, cl. 1.
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dance with governing international norms, which include the right of the
conqueror to impose "duties" on imported goods to help finance its war effort and to maintain its government in the occupied territory.' 6 This latter
purpose was especially important in California because the import fees were
expected to be the military government's only source of revenue for quite
some time. 7 These war tariffs collected by American military personnel in
California during the actual hostilities with Mexico were obviously a valid
exercise of the President's war powers, and no party involved in Cross v.
Harrisonever suggested otherwise.
On February 3, 1848, Mexico and the United States signed a treaty of
peace that ended the formal hostilities between the nations and also permanently ceded a large territory, including California, to the United States.' 8
Ratifications of the treaty were exchanged in Queretaro, Mexico, on May 30,
1848. The military governor of California formally announced the ratification of the peace treaty to the people of the territory on August 7, 1848.19
Obviously, there could be no war tariff if there was no war. Any "duties" levied after the end of the war had to be imposed pursuant to the normal
peacetime taxing powers of Congress. The military officials in California
fully recognized this fact. On August 9, 1848, two days after the formal announcement in California of the peace treaty, the Secretary of State of the
military government notified Harrison's predecessor as the customs collector in San Francisco that "the tariff of duties for the collection of military
contributions will immediately cease, and the revenue laws and tariff of the
United States will be substituted in its place."2 0 The California government
then applied the congressionally-enacted, generally applicable tariff schedules to goods imported into California.
Harrison was appointed temporary collector by the governor of California on September 3, 1848. On February 23, 1849, Harrison demanded
$105.62 in duties from Cross, Hobson & Co. in order for it to land its goods
in San Francisco. The company paid the duties under protest. On March 3,
16 Prior to Cross, the Supreme Court had expressly recognized this power, finding it applicable both

when the United States occupies foreign territory, see Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 602 (1850), and
when foreign nations occupy American soil, see United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 \WheeL) 246 (1819).

17The letter instructing the military authorities to impose the duties stated that the money collected

was "to be applied to the purposes of the war, and among these purposes is the support of the temporary
civil government." Letter from W.L. Marcy, supra note 12, reprintedin S. DOC. NO. 31-18,supra note
12, at 245. Congress could, of course, have funded the government without recourse to such import

fees, but according to Secretary Marcy, there was no reason to expect any money from Congress "much
within a year from this time." Id. Thus, the military government was left to rely for its operation on import fees and any other internal sources of revenue that it could find.
18 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848,
U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty].
19 Proclamation of R.B. Mason to the People of California (Aug. 7, 1848), reprintedin S. DOeC. No.
31-18, supra note 12, at 566-67.

20 Letter from H.W. Halleck, Lieutenant, to Captain J.L. Folsom, Collector, San Francisco, CA

(Aug. 9, 1848), reprintedin S. Doc. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 568.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1849, Congress formally extended its tariff laws to California and authorized the appointment of a customs collector for San Francisco. 21 On November 13, 1849, Harrison was relieved as collector by James Collier, who,
in the intriguing words of the Supreme Court, "had been regularly appointed. 22 No objection was made to any tariffs collected by Collier on or
after November 13, 1849.
During the fall of 1849, a convention was held in California to draft a
constitution in anticipation of statehood. The constitution was ratified on
December 12, 1849, and the military authorities at that point gave effective
control of the territory to the civilian authorities acting under that constitution.23 On September 9, 1850, Congress admitted California as a state.24
In 1851, Cross, Hobson & Co. sued to recover all of the tariffs collected
by Harrison and by his predecessor dating from February 3, 1848 to November 13, 1849, when Collier relieved Harrison as the customs collector.
This simple time line omits some essential embellishments. Most significantly, Harrison was "appointed" as customs collector of San Francisco
by Colonel R.B. Mason, who was governor of California during the military
occupation. Mason held his position as "governor" solely by virtue of the
President's power as commander-in-chief to administer occupied territory
during wartime. 25 Harrison's "appointment" by Mason took place, however,
more than three months after the exchange of treaty ratifications that ended
the war. Even if one allows for the slowness of communications in the midnineteenth century, 26 Harrison was "appointed" by "Governor" Mason nearly
a month after Mason had formally announced to the people of California, by
proclamation, that the peace treaty had been ratified. Where did a military
commander get the authority to appoint a military customs collector during a

21 Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 112,9 Stat. 400.
22

Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 181 (1854).

As opposed to Harrison's "irregular"

appointment?
23 For a detailed account of the California constitutional convention, see Myra K. Saunders, California Legal History: The CaliforniaConstitutionof 1849,90 LAW LIAR. J.447 (1998).
24 Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 452 (1850).
25 Mason took "office" as Governor on May 31, 1847. See Proclamation of R.B. Mason (May 31,
1847), reprintedin S. Doc. NO. 31-18, supra note 12, at 313-14.
26 Messages had to be carried physically from the Eastern United States to California, and that was
no small feat. Consider Collier's account of his journey to his new post:
I am at last at my post. The delay attendant upon my arrival has been to me a great source ofanxiety, and given me much trouble ....I have suffered much of hardship, of privation, and toil, and
encountered no little of peril. We were compelled, for several days in succession, to fight our way
through hostile bands of Indians, but escaped without the loss of life on our part, and with but one
man wounded, he having both bones of his arm broken. It is with great regret that I have to state,
also, that in crossing the Colorado, four persons were drowned, and that one of the number was
Captain Thorn, of New York, who was in command of the dragoons. At some future period I hope
to give you some account of my pilgrimage, and ofthe miserable country we have passed over.
Letter from J. Collier, Collector, to W.M. Meredith, Secretary of the Treasury (Nov. 13, 1849), reprinted
in S.Doc. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 24.
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time of peace? And where did a military officer get the authority to collect
peacetime federal customs duties without congressional authorization?
The constitutional answer would seem pretty clearly to be "nowhere."
The constitutional authorization for a military government stems, as we
have noted, from the President's power as commander-in-chief. Once the
war is over, however, the occupied territory, in accordance with the treaty
of peace, will either be ceded to the United States or not. If it is not, and the
territory has been returned to its previous sovereign or has become an independent state, then the United States has no more power to govern it and to
collect tariffs than it normally would in any foreign country. If the occupied territory is ceded to the United States, then it becomes territory belonging to the United States. At that point, the constitutional rules for
governance shift.
Article IV of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations resecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States ...." During peacetime, in other words, the Constitution seems to grant to Congress,
not to the President, the power to govern American territory.28 Importantly,
the normal constitutional rules on delegation of legislative authority do not
apply to the power to administer territories, so Congress may choose to
exercise its power by legislatively micro-managing territorial affairs, by
giving executive officials virtually complete authority in the territory, or
(under long-settled, if arguably erroneous, doctrine) by giving territories a
substantial measure of self-governance through elected territorial legislatures.30 But in any case, the power to govern, in whomever it is ultimately
vested, must originate in a congressional statute enacted pursuant to Article
IV. Similarly, the authority to impose customs duties in peacetime lies ex2 (emphasis added).
27 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.

as Similarly, the Constitution grants to Congress the power "[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in
all Cases whatsoever, over such District... as may ... become the Seat of the Government of the
United States...
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.17.
29 The normal constitutional rules on delegation stem from the Sweeping Clause of Article 1,which
requires any laws that implement federal powers to be "necessary and proper." U.S. Co.NsT. art. !,§ 8,
cl.18. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 108-09 (1998); Gary Lawson, iho Legislates?, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REv. 147, 150-51 [hereinafter Lawson, 1Who Legislates?]. The Territories
Clause of Article IV, however, is a general grant of legislative authority to Congress. The same is true
of the District Clause, which gives Congress power of "exclusive Legislation" over the District of Co-

17. When Congress is enacting
lumbia and federal property within states. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, Cl.
legislation for the administration of territories or other federal property, it does not need to invoke the

Sweeping Clause as part of its constitutional authorization. Accordingly, any limitations contained in
the Sweeping Clause, including the prohibition on delegations of legislative authority, do not apply to
legislation concerning territories or federal property. Sce Lawson, Who Legislates?, supra. at 154-55.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that delegation principles do not apply to territorial governance.
See Lawson, supranote 4, at 903-05.

30 This last alternative has long been the favorite of Congress, for obvious reasons. See Lawson,

supra note 4, at 900. As an original matter, elected territorial legislatures raise serious problems under

the Appointments Clause, see id.
at 901, but those problems have been almost universally ignored.
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clusively with Congress; the President can no more impose a peacetime tariff than he or she can create a bankruptcy code or declare war.
Congress, however, never passed a statute for the governance of California-not even a statute that authorized the President to continue in place
the wartime military government. On a more mundane doctrinal level,
Colonel Mason, as the chief executive of a large federal territory, was
surely a principal officer within the meaning of Article II's Appointments
Clause, 3' which means that he could only validly serve as the civil governor
if he was nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.32 Mason, of course, was never formally nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate for the post of governor of California. 33 Accordingly,
after the termination of hostilities, there would appear to be no authority for
"Governor" Mason or any of his subordinates to act as officials of California, and Harrison's appointment as "collector" is therefore equally suspect. 34 Indeed, there would appear to be no constitutional authority for any
kind of American-led government in California in the absence of a congressionally-enacted organic statute.
Colonel Mason worried about this problem as much as anyone. On
August 19, 1848, he wrote a lengthy letter to the Department of War which
read in part:
For the past two years no civil government has existed here, save that
controlled by the senior military or naval officer; and no civil officers exist in
the country, save the alcades appointed or confirmed by myself. To throw off
31 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges
of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments").
32 Article It does not use the term "principal Officer." Instead, it authorizes Congress to permit the
appointment of "inferior" officers through certain modes other than presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation, which has the effect of requiring presidential nomination and Senate confirmation for non"inferior" officers.
33 As a colonel in the military, of course, Mason had been properly appointed as an officer of the
United States. But that office did not include, as part of its normal duties, serving as the peacetime governor of a federal territory. A new appointment was clearly needed for a post of that magnitude-just as
the Secretary of Defense could not be given authority to administer federal anti-pollution laws without a
separate appointment. See generally Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 173-76 (1994) (discussing
when an officer's new duties require a separate appointment); id. at 196 (Scalia, J., concurring) (same).
34 The post ofcustoms collector is undoubtedly an inferior office, so that if Mason was properly appointed as Governor, Congress could surely have permitted him, as one of the "Heads of Departments,"
to appoint customs collectors. But see Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 886
(1991) (stating, in a five to four decision, that the Chief Judge of the Tax Court cannot be one of the
constitutional "Heads of Departments" because that term means only "executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments"). Interestingly, however, when Congress finally authorized the appointment of a
customs collector on March 3, 1849, it chose to employ presidential appointment with Senate confirmation. See 9 Stat. 400, § 2.
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upon them or the people at large the civil management and control of the country, would most probably lead to endless confusions, if not to absolute anarchy; andyet what right or authorityhave I to exercise civil control in time of
peace in a Territory of the United States? ...

Yet... I feel compelled to ex-

ercise control over the alcades appointed, and to maintain order, if possible, in
the country, until a civil governor arrive, armed with instructions and laws to
guide his footsteps.
In like manner, if all customs were withdrawn, and the ports thrown open
free to the world, San Francisco would be made the depot of all the foreign
goods in the north Pacific, to the injury of our revenue and the interests of our
own merchants. To prevent this great influx of foreign goods into the country
duty free, I feel it my duty to attempt the collection of duties according to the
United States Tariff of 1846. This will render it necessary for me to appoint
temporary collectors, &c., in the several ports of entry, for the military force is
too much reduced to attend to those duties.
I am fully aware that, in taking these steps, I have no further authority
than that the existing government must necessarilycontinue until some other is
organized to take its place,for I have been left without any definite instructions in reference to the existing state of affairs. But the calamities and disorders which would surely follow the absolute withdrawal of even a show of
authority, impose on me, in my opinion, the imperative duty to pursue the
course I have indicated, until the arrival of despatches from Washington
(which I hope are35already on their way) relative to the organization of a regular
civil government.
On October 7, 1848, the Secretary of State of the United States directly
addressed the problem of congressional inaction concerning a government
for California. His remarkable comments (about which we will say much
more in Part III) deserve to be quoted at length:
The President, in his annual message, at the commencement of the next
session, will recommend all these great measures to Congress in the strongest
terms, and will use every effort, consistent with his duty, to insure their accomplishment.
In the mean time, the condition of the people of California is anomalous,
and will require, on their part, the exercise of great prudence and discretion. By
the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, the military government which was established over them under the laws of war, as recognized by the practice of all civilized nations, has ceased to derive its authority from this source of power. But is
there, for this reason, no government in California? Are life, liberty, and property under the protection of no existing authorities? This would be a singular
phenomenon in the face of the world, and especially among American citizens,
distinguished as they are above all other people for their law-abiding character.
Fortunately, they are not reduced to this sad condition. The termination of the
war left an existing government, a government defacto, in full operation, and
this will continue, with the presumed consent of the people, until Congress
35 Letter from B. Mason, Colonel, to IL Jones, Adjutant General (Aug. 19, 1848), reprintcdin S.
Doc. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 573-74 (emphasis added).
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shall provide for them a territorial government. The great law of necessity justifies this conclusion. The consent of the people is irresistibly inferred from
the fact that no civilized community could possibly desire to abrogate an existing government, when the alternative presented would be to place themselves
in a state of anarchy, beyond the protection of all laws, and reduce them to the
unhappy necessity of submitting to the dominion of the strongest.
This government defacto will, of course, exercise no power inconsistent
with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which is the supreme law of the land. For this reason no import duties can be levied in California on articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States, as
no such duties can be imposed in any other part of our Union on the productions of California. Nor can new duties be charged in California upon such
foreign productions as have already paid duties in any of our ports of entry, for
the obvious reason that California is within the territory of the United States. I
shall not enlarge upon36this subject, however, as the Secretary of the Treasury
will perform that duty.

This was the backdrop of the lawsuit to recover the duties imposed by
"Collector" Harrison. The trial court essentially instructed the jury to find
for the government, 37 which it did, and the case went to the Supreme Court.
II. AVOIDING ANACHRONISM

The stakes in this case ran much higher than a year-and-a-half s worth
of customs duties paid by Cross, Hobson & Co. Obviously, if Harrison had
no legal authority to act in an official capacity, neither did anyone else in
the California "government." If that "government" in fact had no legal authorization under the laws and Constitution of the United States, then all of
the actions taken by its "officials" that amounted to ordinary private law
violations could give rise to liability and private law remedies, such as
damages. In addition, any actions of the military government that affected
private rights, such as the adjudication of land titles, would come under a
cloud. A holding that, for any relevant period of time, there was no legal
authorization for the military government in California would have potentially staggering consequences.
In similar circumstances today, lawyers would immediately hone in on
the two following issues that might well dispose of the case in short order,
or at least would severely mitigate the effects of a holding against the legality of the military government: (1) official immunity and (2) various doctrines that are used to legitimate the actions of de facto government
officials. These doctrines permit judgment in favor of defendants even
when the defendants act without legal authorization. If Cross were decided
today, the question of the constitutionality vel non of the military regime
36 Letter from James Buchanan, Secretary of the United States of America, to William V. Vorhics

(Oct. 7, 1848), reprintedin S. DOC. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 7-8.
37 See 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 186-88 (1854).
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would clearly take a back seat to these "threshold" issues. Indeed, in all
likelihood, the constitutional issues would never be reached.
Such defenses were not decisive in 1854, however, because they did
not then exist, at least not in the forms in which we are accustomed to them
today. In order to understand the issues in Cross, one must avoid looking at
the case through the lens of modem doctrines that had no applicability in
1854.
A. Official Immunity
Cross v. Harrisonwas not a suit against the United States or the territorial government of California. Any suit against the United States or its
instrumentalities would have been flatly barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, which was well established by 1848. There were no statutes at
that time generally waiving sovereign immunity for such claims. 39 Any relief from the government itself would have had to come from a private bill
enacted by Congress specifically authorizing payment to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff instead sued Harrison, the customs collector, in his personal capacity. The claim was a straightforward action of assumpsit for the
return of moneys improperly collected.40 If the plaintiff won, the judgment
would run against Harrison personally, though the United States would be
free, if it so wanted, to indemnify Harrison against damages either before or
after the entry ofjudgment.
Today, the first inquiry in such a case would be whether the defendant,
a government official, was entitled to qualified immunity, meaning that liability could be imposed only if the defendant violated a "clearly established"
legal norm.4 1 Because the constitutionality of a peacetime military government had not been specifically settled before Cross, one can easily imagine a
court holding that Mason, Harrison, and other officials did not violate a constitutional norm that was "clearly established" in 1848 within the meaning of
the qualified immunity doctrine. 42 The doctrine of official immunity, how38 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,411-12 (1821).
39 The Tucker Act, which waives sovereign immunity for claims against the United States founded

on statutes, regulations, or the Constitution, was not enacted in anything resembling its prcsent form until 1887. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.

40 Although it was a garden-variety common law suit, the case was initially heard in a federal trial
court in the Southern District of New York. The defendant no doubt invoked a statutory removal provi-

sion pertaining to suits under, or under color of, the customs laws. See Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 109, § 2,
3 Stat. 396.
41 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-19 (1982) (setting out the framework for the modem
law of official immunity). For a useful summary of the ways in which qualified immunity poses a serious bar to official liability, see Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking FictionSeriously: The Strange Results of
Public Officials'IndividualLiability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. LJ. 65, 80-90 (1999).
42 One could, we suppose, also imagine a court saying that the unconstitutionality of the military

government was so blatant that anyone could see it (as indeed did the military authorities in California).
In that circumstance, application of the official immunity doctrine would not have helped Harrison.
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ever, is a distinctly modem phenomenon. In the mid-nineteenth century, official status was no defense at all to a suit for damages. Official status only
worked as a defense if the defendant was in fact validly authorized to take
the action in question. In the absence of actual legal authorization, to be determined by a court, a jury, or both without deference to the views of the
government, the defendant stood before the law as an ordinary person. A
good faith belief in legal authorization counted for nothing.
The full scope of the pre-modem view on immunity, which largely
prevailed for the better part of two hundred years, is illustrated by the Supreme Court's 1804 decision in Little v. Barreme.43 As a result of hostilities, which did not quite rise to the level of war, between the United States
and France, Congress declared forfeit any vessel wholly or partly owned or
hired by Americans that engaged in commerce with anyone subject to
French jurisdiction." Congress then authorized the President, as military
commander-in-chief, to instruct naval officers to:
stop and examine any ship or vessel of the United States on the high sea,
which there may be reason to suspect to be engaged in any traffic or commerce
contrary to the true tenor hereof, and if, upon examination, it should appear
that such ship is bound to or sailing to any place within the territory of the
lawful to seize such vessel,
French republic or her dependencies, it is rendered 45
and send her into the United States for adjudication.
The statute contained a seeming loophole: it only authorized presidential seizures of vessels sailing to French ports but made no provision for the
seizure of vessels sailing from French ports.4 6 The President's instructions
to the nation's naval officers nonetheless ordered the officers to seize vessels travelling either to or from French ports:
A proper discharge of the important duties enjoined on you, arising out of
this act, will require the exercise of a sound and an impartialjudgment. You
are not only to do all that in you lies to prevent all intercourse, whether direct
or circuitous, between the ports of the United States and those of Franceand
her dependencies, where the vessels or cargoes are apparentlyas well as really
American, and protected by American papers only, but you are to be vigilant
that vessels or cargoes really American, but covered by Danish or47other foreign papers, and bound to orfrom Frenchports, do not escape you.
Acting under these orders from the President of the United States, Captain Little seized a ship travelling from a French to an American port and
43 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).

44 Act of Feb. 9, 1799, ch. 2, § 1, 1 Stat. 613, 613-14.
41 Id. § 5, 1 Stat. 615 (emphasis added).
46 The "loophole" might make sense if the purpose of the statute was to deny the entry of provisions
into France rather than to prohibit trade altogether, though even in that case one would probably want to
deny France the proceeds from exports.
47 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 171 (emphasis altered).
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brought it to Boston. The owner of the ship maintained that the seizure was
unlawful and sued Captain Little, in his personal capacity, for damages to
the ship resulting from the seizure. The circuit court awarded damages of
$8,504--which was a considerable sum in 1804-and Captain Little appealed. Chief Justice Marshall issued this remarkable opinion for a unanimous Court:
These orders given by the executive under the construction of the act of
congress made by the department to which its execution was assigned, enjoin
the seizure of American vessels sailing from a French port. Is the officer who
obeys them liable for damages sustained by this misconstruction of the act, or
will his orders excuse him? If his instructions afford him no protection, then
the law must take its course, and he must pay such damages as are legally
awarded against him; if they excuse an act not otherwise excusable, it would
then be necessary to inquire whether this is a case in which the probable cause
which existed to induce a suspicion that the vessel was American, would excuse the captor from damages when the vessel appeared in fact to be neutral.
I confess the first bias of my mind was very strong in favour of the opinion
that though the instructions of the executive could not give a right, they might
yet excuse from damages. I was much inclined to think that a distinction ought
to be taken between acts of civil and those of military officers; and between proceedings within the body of the country and those on the high seas. That implicit obedience which military men usually pay to the orders of their
superiors, which indeed is indispensably necessary to every military system,
appeared to me strongly to imply the principle that those orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the person whose general duty it is to
obey them, and who is placed by the laws of his country in a situation which in
general requires that he should obey them. I was strongly inclined to think that
where, in consequence of orders from the legitimate authority, a vessel is seized
with pure intention, the claim of the injured party for damages would be against
that government from which the orders proceeded, and would be a proper subject for negotiation. But I have been convinced that I was mistaken, and I have
receded from this first opinion. I acquiesce in that of my brethren, which is, that
the instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or 4legalize an act
which without those instructions would have been a plain trespass. s
Captain Little was an American naval officer acting pursuant to presidential orders during a time of hostilities. Nonetheless, because the presidential order exceeded the authorization of the underlying statute, Captain
Little could not invoke the presidential order as an actual authorization for
his action. Nor were his good faith belief in the validity of the order and the
prospect of a court martial for disobeying a presidential directive sufficient
to immunize him from ordinary tort liability. Without an actual authorization for his action, Captain Little stood in no better position before the law
than would a random tortfeasor. Congress ultimately passed a private bill

48 Id. at 178-79.
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indemnifying Captain Little for the award of damages, 4 9 but that was simply
Captain Little's good fortune.
Was Little v. Barreme correctly decided from an originalist perspective? The answer is yes, though that does not necessarily mean that modem
5
law is wrong to extend immunity to people in Captain Little's situation.
To explain this cryptic and seemingly paradoxical answer would require a
lengthy analysis, which we hope to provide in a future work. For now, all
we can say is that official immunity must be viewed in the context of other
doctrines that limit or permit recovery for governmental wrongs: a baseline
of governmental accountability, which we think can be established on
originalist grounds,5 ' does not necessarily require any one specific mechanism of accountability. A relaxation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
for example, might permit a concomitant tightening up of the doctrine of official immunity.
But that is a story for another day. In 1804, and in 1854, the answer-and the correct originalist answer-was that there was no official
immunity 2 because there was no other formal mechanism of governmental
accountability. A private lawsuit against the offending government officer
was the only way to vindicate in court a private-law wrong that resulted
from official action. Under this regime, Collector Harrison would have
needed to show actual, valid legal authorization for his action. Otherwise,
he had committed a simple act of extortion. Harrison's good faith belief in
his legal authorization would surely shield him from criminal liability for
his conduct, but because the action of assumpsit does not require a bad motive, nothing would shield him from civil liability for monies that he unlawfully took from the plaintiff. Perhaps the United States would indemnify
Harrison for any judgment and perhaps not. But that would not be the concern of the law. Thus, Harrison did not raise an official immunity defense
because the defense was unavailable.

49 Act of Jan. 17, 1807, ch. 4, 6 Stat. 63.
50 The modem law of immunity may in fact be wrong in many, or even most, important respects, but
that conclusion does not straightforwardly follow from Little v. Barreme'scorrectness in 1804.
51 For an extended argument in favor of governmental accountability, see James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a FirstAmendment Right to Pursue Claims Against the

Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899 (1997). We have elsewhere criticized Professor Pfander's argument that the first amendment right to petition bears on the propriety of federal sovereign immunity, see
Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 739 (1999), but see
James E. Pfander, Restoring the Right to Petition, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 219 (1999) (responding), but that
dispute is separate from the question whether the Constitution mandates some form of accountability for
official acts.
52 Indeed, the Supreme Court did not even craft a broadjudicialimmunity until 1871. See Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
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B. De Facto Officer

Another obvious modem response to the lawsuit in Cross would be to
say that even if the California government was unconstitutional, it was acting
under color of law. People residing in California would reasonably believe
that they were obliged to obey the government officials and were, therefore,
entitled to rely on that obedience. Perhaps the government could, in some
formal sense, be declared unconstitutional, but surely that should not undo
everything that happened while it was acting with apparent authority. The
formal expression for this commonsense view is the de facto officer doctrine.
The de facto officer doctrine has existed for more than five-hundred
years.53 In its simplest form, it legally validates the acts of a government
official who illegally holds office, provided that the officer "is in fact in the
unobstructed possession of an office and discharging its duties in full view
of the public, in such manner and under such circumstances as not to present the appearance of being an intruder or usurper."' ' The doctrine prevents collateral attacks on an officer's qualifications through a challenge to
the officer's actions. The effect, and purpose, is to prevent technical defects
in an officer's title, such as a clerical error or a failure to post a required
bond, from having potentially disastrous effects on settled legal rights.55
For example, in McDowell v. United States,56 a circuit judge had designated
Augustus S. Seymour, a North Carolina district judge, to serve temporarily
in the district of South Carolina. There were serious questions about the
circuit judge's ability to make this designation under the relevant statutes.
The plaintiff was convicted and sentenced by Judge Seymour while the
judge was sitting in South Carolina, and the plaintiff challenged those rulings on the ground that Judge Seymour lacked authority to issue them. The
Court held that, regardless of the formal legality of his designation, Judge
Seymour was a de facto judge while serving in South Carolina and his decisions could not be challenged.57 This de facto officer doctrine seems tailormade for a case like Cross v. Harrison,in which persons with questionable
authorization acted in the role of government officials.
There are, however, several problems with applying the de facto officer doctrine to Cross. First, and most obviously, the Supreme Court had
not formally recognized the doctrine in 1854. It had applied the doctrine in
dictum in 1842,58 but the doctrine was not developed in holdings until the
late nineteenth century.
53 See Clifford L. Pannam, UnconstitutionalStatutes andDo Facto Officers. 2 FED. L REv. 37, 3940 (1966).
54 Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302, 323 (1902).

55 See Kathryn A. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The CaseFor Continucd Application, 85 COLUm. L. REv.1121, 1122 (1985).
56 159 U.S. 596 (1895).
57 See id. at 601-02.
58 See Cocke v. Halsey, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 71, 84-88 (1842).
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Second, and more fundamentally, even had the doctrine applied in
1854, Harrison would not have satisfied its formal requirements. The de
facto officer doctrine is designed to address technical defects in officeholding. The problem with Harrison was not a technical defect in his appointment, such as, for example, the lack of a quorum during Senate
confirmation, but the fact that his "office" was putatively illegal. There was
no statute creating the office of customs collector in California until November 3, 1849, and there was certainly no statute creating the office of
''person who calls himself a customs collector but who really is collecting
military exactions under a military government, albeit one that is operating
during peacetime." The real question in the case concerned the legitimacy
of Harrison's office itself, not the specific qualifications of the officeholder.
Indeed, within a few decades of Cross, the Supreme Court was to hold that
the de facto officer doctrine cannot be applied when the statute creating the
office in question is unconstitutional: there can be no de facto officer if there
is no office to hold de facto. 59 That holding has been widely criticized,60 but
those criticisms are based on a conflation of the de facto officer doctrine with
other, related concepts concerning de facto authority. One who seeks to defend Harrison on these general grounds needs to say not simply that one can
have de facto officers, but that one can also have de facto offices, which is a
very different claim. What is needed to make a case like Cross v. Harrison
go away quietly is a doctrine of de facto government.
C. De Facto Government
In his letter dated October 7, 1848, Secretary of State James Buchanan
specifically referred to the California military authorities as a "de facto
government." Was this label accurate and did it shield the actions of that
government from legal scrutiny?
As an introduction to these questions, it is useful to examine two cases
that are sandwiched in time around Cross, and whose fame is as great as
Cross 's obscurity: Lutherv. Borden6' and Texas v. White.62
Luther v. Borden was decided in 1849, just a few years before Cross.
The case arose out of a civil war in Rhode Island in 1841-42. Rhode Island
had been governed since 1663 by the charter granted by Charles II. In
1841, however, a group of Rhode Island citizens took it upon themselves to
hold a constitutional convention and to form a new government under that
59 See Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,440-42 (1886); see also McLaughry v. Deming, 186
U.S. 49, 63 (1902) (holding that the de facto officer doctrine cannot apply to an improperly constituted
court martial).
60 See George S. Harris, The Validity of Acts of Officers Occupying Offices Created Under Laws
Declared Unconstitutional,3 U. NEWARK L. REv. 123, 125-31 (1938); Pannam, supra note 53, at 5057; Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine, 63 COLUtM. L. REv. 909, 914-15 (1963).
61 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
62 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
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instrument. They declared the adoption and ratification of the new constitution, elected and appointed officers of the new government, and asked the
charter government to step aside. The charter government instead declared
martial law and effectively prevented the new "government" (henceforth
called the "unsanctioned government") from exercising power. This state
of affairs continued until May 1843, when the charter government voluntarily disbanded in favor of a government that was formed in accordance with
a constitution adopted at a January 1842 convention sponsored and sanctioned by the charter government.
The plaintiff was a supporter of the unsanctioned government. During
the period of martial law, the defendants, purportedly acting under the authority of the charter government, entered the plaintiff's house without
permission and sought to arrest him. The plaintiff sued for trespass. If the
charter government had ceased to have any legal authority upon the formation of the unsanctioned government, then there was no actual authorization
for the defendants' actions and, as was demonstrated in Little v. Barreme,
there would be no obvious defense to the plaintiff's trespass action." If the
charter government continued to have authority, however, then the question
would become whether that authority was sufficient to immunize the defendants' actions from civil liability. Thus, the Supreme Court was called
upon to determine whether the charter government or the unsanctioned government was the rightful authority in Rhode Island in 1842.
The Court was acutely aware of the potential stakes in the case:
For, if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry as proposed by
the plaintiff, and it should be decided that the charter government had no legal
existence during the period of time above mentioned,--if it had been annulled
by the adoption of the opposing govemment,-then the laws passed by its legislature during that time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected; its salaries and compensation to its officers illegally paid; its public accounts
improperly settled; and the judgments and sentences of its courts in civil and
criminal cases null and void, and the officers who carried their decisions into
operation answerable as trespassers, if not in some cases as criminals.6
The Court sided with the charter government. Everyone agreed that
the Rhode Island courts that held office under the May 1843 constitution
were legally valid, and those courts had clearly treated the charter government as the valid authority by, inter alia, upholding convictions of persons
who raised as a defense their purported authority under the unsanctioned
government.6 5 The Court held that the federal courts were bound by the determinations of state courts concerning the legitimacy of their owm governments. 66 The Court was, however, worried enough about this question to
63 See suprasubpart II.A.

64 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 38-39.
65 Id. at 39.
66 Id. at 40-41.
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bolster its primary holding with a variety of other arguments, including perceived evidentiary problems,67 the awkwardness of potentially differing
pronouncements on governmental legitimacy from different courts, 68 and a
lengthy dictum on the limited role of courts under Article IV's Guarantee
Clause.6 9 The Court was obviously uncomfortable deciding the issue of authority, but it reached a decision nonetheless.
How, one might ask, could the Court have done anything other than
decide the issue in one way or another? One can imagine the Court issuing
the following opinion:
We frankly don't care whether the charter government or the unsanctioned government was the "real" government in 1842. Whether or not the
charter government was lawful, it was at least a de facto government. It existed, with unquestioned de jure authority, prior to 1842 and it never clearly relinquished power until 1843. Had the unsanctioned government succeeded in
its attempted overthrow for some period of time, it would be an interesting
question whether it could also qualify during that period as a de facto government, but the unsanctioned government never had enough power to pose that
question. In any event, even if the unsanctioned government was the de jure
government of Rhode Island, the actions of the charter government had enough
appearance of authority to clothe its officials with whatever immunity governmental status provides. Our question is now whether that governmental
status, under the state of martial law declared by the government, was enough
to defeat the plaintiffs trespass action.
Such a holding would have neatly solved all of the problems that the
Court in Luther found so troubling. 70 Nonetheless, the Court did not adopt
any theory of de facto governmental authorization to dispose of the case.
Twenty years later, however, matters were a bit different. Prior to the
outbreak of the Civil War, the State of Texas had acquired certain bonds
from the United States. Texas law at that time required the endorsement of
the state governor before the bonds could be negotiated. When the Confederate government took control in Texas during the war, it repealed the statute requiring the governor's endorsement and it used the bonds to acquire
supplies. After the war, the State of Texas, through the Reconstruction
government imposed by Congress and the President, sought recovery of the
bonds on the ground that the absence of a proper endorsement from the
governor rendered them non-negotiable and voided all transfers, including
67 Id. at 41-42.
68 Id. at 42.
69 See id. at 42-45. The Guarantee Clause provides that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Goverment...." U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 4.
70 As an aside: The Court probably should have found more troubling than it did the question
whether even governmental authorization could help the defendants in Luther. The Court assumed
without much analysis that the state of martial law was enough justification for the defendants' actions
to close off tort liability. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45-46. That issue, however, was not as easily
in the defendants' favor as the Court made it appear. See id. at 58-88 (Woodbury, J., dissenting),
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the initial transfer from the state treasury. The suit was an original bill in
the Supreme Court, pursuant to the clauses in Article III extending federal
jurisdiction to "controversies ... between a State and citizens of another
State"7 1 and granting the Supreme
72 Court original jurisdiction over cases "in
which a State shall be a Party."
In Texas v. White, decided fifteen years after Cross, the Court held that
Texas was a "State" for purposes of these jurisdictional clauses, notwithstanding its purported secession, its governance by federal officials, and its
lack of representation in the Congress and the electoral college. 73 We are
not concerned here with whether that holding was correct. Our focus is on
the action of the rebel government in purporting to alter the manner in
which the bonds could be negotiated. If that statute was valid, then Texas
should have lost on the merits. If the act of secession was, as the Court
held, illegal, then the legislature of the rebel government was not a de jure
legislative body. But could its enactments nonetheless have legal force as
the acts of a de facto government? The Court acknowledged that the rebel
government of Texas was "to some extent '7 4 "a de facto government, and
its acts, during the period of its existence as such, would be effectual, and,
in almost all respects, valid. ' 5 The Court in 1869 thus expressly endorsed
the concept of a de facto government whose actions could create binding
legal rights even without de jure authority.
Well, almost. An unqualified holding to this effect would, as noted,
mean that Texas should have lost the case. The Court's next task was to
explain why the repealing act was different from all other acts:
It is not necessary to attempt any exact definitions, within which the acts
of such a State government must be treated as valid, or invalid. It may be said,
perhaps with sufficient accuracy, that acts necessary to peace and good order
among citizens, such for example, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage
and the domestic relations, governing the course of descents, regulating the
conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, and providing remedies
for injuries to person and estate, and other similar acts, which would be valid if
emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general as valid
when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful government; and that acts in
furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of citizens and other acts of like nature, must, in general, be
regarded as invalid and void. 6

71 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c. 1.
72 Id. atart. III,§2, cl.2.
73 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720-31 (1869).
74 Id. at 733.
75ld.
76 Id.
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In other words, good acts are valid and bad acts are not. Applying this
standard, the Court held that allowing the negotiability of the77bonds in order
to finance the war effort was a bad act and therefore invalid.
Which view is right: the implicit view in Luther that only de jure authority will validate a government or the explicit view in White that de facto

authority is generally, or at least often, good enough? The recognition of de
facto authority, especially at the federal level, is very troubling. The whole

point-the revolutionary point-of the federal Constitution was to create a
government of limited and enumerated powers. No federal institution is
supposed to be able to act without constitutional authorization. That
scheme can be seriously undermined by the existence of a "shadow government" that exists without legal authorization but whose acts are nonetheless binding. A "de facto federal authority" is almost a contradiction in
terms. Moreover, as Texas v. White demonstrates, after one lets in the notion of a de facto authority, that generates the unenviable task of discerning
exactly how far that authority goes. Does de facto authority legitimate everything that the illegal government does? Everything that a legitimate government in the place of the illegitimate government would have done? This
last, counterfactual alternative raises hopeless conceptual and practical
problems. For example, although we have not researched the point, we are
confident that the rebel government in Texas altered the tax structure in
ways that helped the government finance the war effort. Were those laws
therefore invalid under the test of Texas v. White because a loyalist state
government would not have enacted them?
On the other hand, the de facto government doctrine conforms to a
powerful intuition that says that private rights, at least, should not be
thrown into jeopardy because of political disputes beyond the control of
most citizens. Should marriages and land titles be held invalid because the
only government available to register them was not a legitimate de jure
government? Should murderers go free because the judges who sentenced
them did not have the proper legal authorization?
A full answer, as is true with many of the themes addressed in this paper, would require a separate article. The key, however, is to place the de
facto government doctrine where it belongs: as part of the law of remedies.
No matter how one analyzes it, de facto authorization is not legal authorization, so the actions of a de facto authority, at least at the federal level, can
never constitute a valid source of substantive law. The question is what legal consequences to attach to this fact when the absence of real authority affects legal rights. When the relief sought by a party is equitable, there is no
conceptual problem with saying that the existence of de facto legal authorization for challenged governmental conduct could and should be relevant to
the decision whether to grant relief. Equitable relief, after all, is normally
discretionary, and it is natural to make concerns about de facto authorization
77 Id. at 733-34.
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part of that equitable balance in an appropriate case. 7 8 The hard questions
come when a party seeks damages in an ordinary action at law and the validity vel non of a governmental act is relevant to the claim. No act of discretionary balancing is required for an award of damages. Where, if anywhere,
do courts get the remedial power to refuse to award damages because of essentially equitable concerns about reliance on de facto governmental acts?
At the federal level," the question reduces to: does "[tlhe judicial
Power of the United States" include some power to overlook de jure illegalities in cases seeking damages? Our very hesitant, and somewhat unsatisfying answer, turns on the currently unpopular distinction between public
and private rights. Where an action for damages concerns essentially private rights, which the government merely administers, there is much to be
said for overlooking technical defects in the administering authority under
some circumstances. Where, however, the case involves public rights,
which would not exist but for the machinery of government, de facto authority is irrelevant.
The reasons for this distinction would have been clearer to an observer
in 1789 than to an observer today. To a fully informed 1789 observer,80
private rights, such as rights of property and contract, exist independently of
the government; the government is there, if at all, only to facilitate and
regularize transactions. As long as the governmental activity in question
essentially formalizes the kinds of transactions that parties would otherwise
engage in, it is not bizarrely counterfactual to presume that matters would
have turned out much the same in the absence of the (assumedly) illegal
governmental authority. That presumption could be overcome by showing,
for example, that the illegal government changed the legal rules so dramatically that the assumption of a continuous baseline is no longer valid. But in
the normal course of events, private rights should not suffer because a de
facto authority signs the papers. No harm, no foul.
Where the de facto authority acts in a public capacity and creates rather
than enforces the legal rules, however, matters are different. We do not
have the time or space here to detail exactly how far this category of public
rights extends,8' nor do we need to do so. The tariffs collected by Harrison

78 Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the HarrisExecution, 102 YALE LJ. 255 (1992) (suggesting that federalism is an appropriate part of remedial balancing
for federal courts).

79 These same inquiries can obviously arise at the state level, and each state can (within the broad

guidelines of the federal constitution) authorize its own courts to resolve these issues in any manner that
seems fit.
80 We argue that this hypothetical person, rather than any actual historical person, is the appropriate
point of inquiry for originalism. A full explication and defense of this claim, however, must await an-

other day.
81 It surely includes criminal law. Does de facto authority therefore mean a free ride for all criminals? The answer may depend on how clearly one can identify a category oftmalum In se offenses. On
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in Cross v. Harrison are clearly in this public category. Indeed, they are
quintessentially the kind of action that exists only because of the presence
of a governmental authority. Thus, even if one were inclined to apply a
doctrine of de facto authority in Cross-and,judging by its decision in Luther v. Borden in 1849, the Court in the early 1850s was not so inclined-it
would not obviate the need to decide Cross on the merits.
One more point bears mentioning. In order to qualify as a de facto

government on any theory, the government in question must be in a position
to command and expect obedience from the public. That was clearly true of
the rebel government in Texas in 1861. It was probably true of the charter
government in Rhode Island in 1842. Whether it was true of the military
government in California in 1848 is a different question altogether, which
we will address later.8 2

III. ANARCHY, STATE, AND MYOPIA

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of
Harrison, finding that all of the duties were properly collected. Because the

case turns on the extent to which changes in events also change the legal
status of various actors, it is best analyzed in terms of discrete time periods.
The plaintiff broke down the case into two principal time periods: (1) between the date of the signing of the peace treaty between the United States
and Mexico (February 3, 1848) and the enactment by Congress of a statute
making San Francisco a collection district under the generally applicable
tariff laws (March 3, 1849) and (2) between the latter date and the replacement of Harrison as a customs collector (November 13, 1849). This reflected the plaintiffs principal theory of the case: although it broadly
challenged the power of the military government to collect even statutorilyimposed tariffs during peacetime, the plaintiff's principal contention was
that tariff laws did not apply to California until Congress specifically extended them by statute.83 The plaintiffs breakdown of the case to accommodate its statutory argument, however, obscures some of the most
important constitutional issues. Accordingly, the Court broke down the
relevant time periods along somewhat different lines, as do we. Because
this case largely involves the consequences of war and peace, a better temporal breakdown focuses on the events surrounding the conduct and termination of the war.

the other hand, the right answer may be simply that a criminal prosecuted by the federal government has
a constitutional right to be prosecuted only in accordance with strictly enforced constitutional norms.
82 See infra subsection III.D.5.b.
83 This was not a surprising litigation strategy. If the statutory argument was successful, the plain.
tiffhad a sure winner on all tariffs up to March 3, 1849. And the plaintiffwas no doubt leery-and justifiably so-of its prospects of prevailing on a broad-based challenge to the authority of the California
military government.
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A. May 13, 1846-February3, 1848: The War Is On
The Court spent a fair amount of energy establishing the obvious: the
war tariffs collected by the military Aovemment in California during the period of actual hostilities were valid. No one ever claimed otherwise, least
of all Cross, Hobson & Co. Its complaint only sought the return of tariffs
collected after February 3, 1848, which marked the signing of the peace
treaty between the United States and Mexico.
B. February3, 1848-May 30, 1848: The War Is Still On
The first real question posed by the case was at what point did legal authorization for the wartime tariff end. As long as the wartime tariff was
valid, Cross, Hobson & Co. clearly had no claim. So how long could the
war tariff really last?
There are at least five possible answers to that question as follows: the
authority for the war tariff ended when (1) the treaty of peace was signed on
February 3, 1848; (2) when ratifications of the treaty were formally exchanged between the United States and Mexico on May 30, 1848; (3)
whenever the treaty itself declared a full end to the war and its legal consequences; (4) when official notification of the ratifications was actually given
to American personnel in California;8S or (5) when official notification of the
ratifications should reasonably have been given to American personnel in
California given the constraints of communications that existed in 1848.
The plaintiff could prevail for the time period before May 30, 1848
only if the first answer was correct. The Court held that the terms of the
peace treaty made clear that this answer was wrong and that authority for
the war tariff therefore continued at least until ratifications of the treaty
were exchanged on May 30, 1848:
Nothing is stipulated in that treaty to be binding upon the parties to it, or
from the date of the signature of the treaty, but that commissioners should be
appointed by the general-in-chief of the forces of the United States, with such
as might be appointed by the Mexican government, to make a provisional suspension of hostilities, that, in the places occupied by our arms, constitutional
order might be reestablished as regards the political, administrative, and judicial branches in those places, so far as that might be permitted by the circumstances of military occupation. All else was contingent until the ratifications
of the trea 8 were exchanged, which was done on the 30th of May, 1848, at
Queretaro.
84 Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 189-91 (1854).
85 "Governor" Mason announced the ratifications by proclamation on August 7, 1848. He claimed to
have received official notification on August 6, 1848 and there is no reason to doubt his veracity. See Letter

from I-B. Mason to Brigadier General 1_ Jones (Aug. 23, 1848), reprintcdin S. DOc. No. 31-18, supra
note 12, at 577.
86 Cross,57 U.S. (16 How.) at 190.
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The Court was entirely correct; the treaty itself stipulated that it would

take full effect only upon ratification by both parties.

7

Accordingly, the

war tariff remained in effect at least until May 30, 1848, and all "duties"
collected before that date were legally valid as military exactions.
C. May 30, 1848-August 9, 1848: The War Is... ?

The time period from May 30, 1848 to the notification to California officials and residents of the peace treaty in August 1848 is more problematic.

The obvious answer is that peace means peace, so that the authority of the
military government expired immediately upon the formal cessation of the
state of war on May 30. That was clearly the magic moment under intemational law. California became the property of the United States on May 30,
1848, so as far as the world at large was concerned, California was no
longer a site where war was being waged. At that point, the norms of international law concerning government of occupied territory ceased to apply to
California because it was no longer occupied; it was thereafter subject to the
full, undivided sovereignty of the United States.
The pertinent question, however, is whether May 30, 1848 was the
magic moment under domestic American law. The answer has great consequences. Channels of communication in 1848 were hardly instantaneous. It
could take weeks or months for news of the termination (or commencement)
of a war to reach across a continent. Even today, with near-instantaneous
forms of communication, there will always be some time lag, however modest, between events and knowledge of those events. If the end of a war carries domestic legal consequences, can those consequences really take effect at
the moment the war, as a matter of public international law, formally ends?
Does it really make sense to say that constitutional authority operates, or disappears, instantaneously across the world, even where it is impossible for
news of the relevant events to travel that fast? Put starkly, when did the
Mexican-American "war," as a matter of domestic American law, really end?
Nations had faced these problems for centuries before Cross v. Harrison, and their solutions are instructive. Although it is possible for a war to
end, as a matter of international law, without a formal treaty of peace,88 a
treaty is the normal means of terminating a war. But ending a war via a
peace treaty means more than simply signing a piece of paper declaring that
fighting should stop. The news of the treaty needs to be sent to the troops
that are actually engaged in combat. In the premodern era, this could easily
take weeks or months. What happens during that transitional period? Are
the soldiers who are still engaged in conflict reduced to the status of vandals
and murderers-or at the very least tortfeasors-because their authority to
engage in war has formally ended?
87 Treaty, supranote 18, at arts. III-IV, 9 Stat. at 923-26.
88 See INGRID DEn'ER DE LUPIS, THE LAW OF WAR 297-98 (1988).
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In the normal course of events, these matters are handled in the peace
treaty. A well-drafted treaty will include realistic timetables for notification
and withdrawal of troops and will contain provisions for immunizing the soldiers and their governments from liability for damage inflicted before news of
the peace can reach them; perhaps it will also contain provisions for
compensation to the citizens and governments that suffer such damage.
The end of the "war," in the extended sense that includes the post-treaty
period of transition, will thus normally be determined by reference to the
treat-..ae Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which terminated (or initiated the
termination) of the Mexican-American War, paid very close attention to
these issues. The treaty was signed on February 2, 1848 and ratifications
were exchanged on May 30, 1848. The treaty was quite specific about the
timetable for implementing the peace agreement. Article III of the treaty
stipulated that "[i]mmediately" 90 upon the exchange of ratifications:
orders shall be transmitted to the commanders of [the United States'] land and
naval forces, requiring the latter.., immediately to desist from blockading any
Mexican ports; and requiring the former... to commence, at the earliest moment practicable, withdrawing all troops of the United States then in the interior of the Mexican Republic, to points that shall be selected by common
agreement, at a distance from the seaports not exceeding thirty leagues; and
such evacuation of the interior of the Republic shall be completed with the
least possible delay; the Mexican government hereby binding itself to afford
every facility in its power for rendering the same convenient to the troops, on
their march and in their new positions91 and for promoting a good understanding between them and the inhabitants.
Orders were also supposed to go out immediately to all United States
personnel in charge of customs houses to return control of the facilities to
Mexican authorities and to provide an accounting of all duties collected after May 30, 1848, which-minus the costs of collection-were to be turned
over to Mexico. 92 Even more specifically, removal of American troops
from the capital of Mexico "shall be completed in one month after the orders there stipulated for shall have been received by the commander of said
troops, or sooner if possible." 93 Article IV of the treaty further provided
that "immediately after the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty all
castles, forts, territories, places, and possessions, which have been taken or
occupied by the forces of the United States during the present war, within
the limits of the Mexican Republic... shall be definitively restored to the
89 For general discussions of these propositions, see WILLIANI EDWiARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 482-95 (J.B. Atlay ed., Oxford 5th ed. 1904); COLEWAN PHILLIPSON, TER INATION OF WAR AND
TREATIES OF PEACE 185-98, 214-17 (1916).
90 Treaty, supranote 18, at art. 111, 9 Stat. at 924.
91 Id.
92 Id.

93Id.
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said Republic .... ,,94
Finally, and most significantly, Article IV specified
that "[t]he final evacuation of the territory of the Mexican Republic, by the
forces of the United States, shall be completed in three months from the
said exchange of ratifications, or sooner if possible." 95 The treaty thus
specified the time at which the final effects of the war, and therefore the
war itself in its broadest sense, were to end: August 30, 1848 or sooner if
the United States could get its troops out more quickly. Until that time, one
could plausibly say that the state of war, and whatever powers flowed to
various agencies of the United States government from that state of affairs,
was still in existence.
At least, one could say this with respect to issues concerning American
troops in what was to remain Mexico after the treaty. But just as constitutions and statutes can become effective in stages, 96 there is no reason to assume that every provision of a treaty must take effect, or every aspect of a
war must end, at the same moment in time. Article V of the treaty ceded to
the United States a vast amount of territory, including the territory that now
comprises the State of California. 97 The treaty said nothing specific about
the timing of the transfer of sovereignty from Mexico to the United States,
so the natural assumption is that the transfer was immediate upon completion of the ratifications. That is the standard rule at international law, and
the Supreme Court had expressly applied that rule just a few years before
Cross in United States v. Reynes,9 8 in connection with the transfers of Louisiana from Spain to France and then to the United States. As the Court explained in refusing to give effect to a purported Spanish land grant within
the territory made after the various treaties concerning Louisiana were exchanged: "In the construction of treaties, the same rules which govern other
compacts properly apply. They must be considered as binding from the period of their execution; their operation must be understood to take effect
from that period, unless it shall, by some condition or stipulation in the
compact itself, be postponed." 99 Nothing in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo suggests any delay in the transfer of sovereignty over California.
Quite to the contrary, provisions in the treaty dealing with the status of
Mexican residents in the transferred territoryou and with the United States'
obligation to prevent Indian incursions into Mexico l0 seem to assume an
immediate transfer. Secretary of State Buchanan flatly declared that "the
94 Id. at art. IV, 9 Stat. at 924. The provision also called for the return to Mexico of all captured
weapons and other property. Id.
95 Id. at art. IV, 9 Stat. at 925.
96 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law? (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
97 Treaty, supra note 18, at art. V, 9 Stat. at 926,
927.
98 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127 (1850).
99 Id. at 148.

1ooSee Treaty, supranote 18, at art. VIII, 9 Stat. at 929, 930.
1l See id. at art. XI, 9 Stat. at 930-32.
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constitution of the United States, the safeguard of all our civil rights, was
extended over California on the 30th May, 1848, the day on which our late
treaty with Mexico was finally consummated. From that day its inhabitants
became entitled to all the blessings and benefits resulting from the best
t
form of civil government ever established amongst men."'1
The Supreme
Court in Cross took it for granted that the cession of territory became effective upon the exchange of ratifications.10 3 Thus, California became the
property of the United States on May 30, 1848. The treaty did not have to
provide for the removal of American troops from that territory because the
territory no longer belonged to Mexico. Thus, the treaty's extension of
some measure of American wartime authority into the territory of Mexico
did not serve to extend American wartime authority into American territory.
Does that mean that the war ended, as far as California is concerned,
on May 30, 1848? If the answer is yes, then the authority for the military
tariff in California ended on that date as well, though such authority held by
military commanders on the Mexican mainland might well have continued
for some time, subject to the treaty's requirement that the proceeds from
such "tariffs" ultimately go to the Mexican government.
That straightforward answer is hard to avoid. As noted above, the
treaty contained careful terms for dealing with certain items beyond the
May 30, 1848 exchange of ratifications but made no such time-specific
provisions for the transfer of sovereignty of California. The inescapable
conclusion is that, as far as California was concerned, the war was over on
May 30, 1848.
The Supreme Court escaped this conclusion nonetheless. Its discussion warrants quotation in full:
[A]fter the ratification of the treaty, California became a part of the United
States, or a ceded, conquered territory. Our inquiry here is to be, whether or
not the cession gave any right to the plaintiffs to have the duties restored to
them, which they may have paid between the ratifications and exchange of the
treaty and the notification of that fact by our government to the military governor
of California. It was not received by him until two months after the ratification,
and not then with any instructions or even remote intimation from the President
that the civil and military government, which had been instituted during the war,
was discontinued. Up to that time, whether such an intimation had or had not
been given, duties had been collected under the war tariff, strictly in conformity with the instructions which had been received from Washington.
It will certainly not be denied that those instructions were binding upon
those who administeredthe civil government in California,until they had no102 Letter from James Buchanan, Secretary of the United States of America, to William V. Vorhies,
supranote 36, reprintedin S. DOC. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 9 (1850). We are not as certain as

was

Buchanan that Madison, Wilson, Hamilton and their contemporaries would have regarded a peacetime

military government as "the best form of civil government ever established amongst men."
103 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 190 (1854) ("But after the ratification ofthe treaty, California became a

part of the United States, or a ceded, conquered territory.").
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ticefrom their own government that a peace had been finally concluded. Or
that those who were locally within itsjurisdiction, or who had property there,
were not bound to comply with those regulations of the government, which its
functionaries were ordered to execute. Or that any one could claim a right to

introduce into the territory of that government foreign merchandise, without
the payment of duties which had been originally imposed under belligerent
rights, because the territory had been ceded by the original possessor and enemy to the conqueror ....

The plaintiffs in this case could claim no privilege

for the introduction of their goods into San Francisco between the ratifications
of the treaty with Mexico and the official annunciation of it to the civil government in California, other than such as that government permitted under the
instructions of the government of the United States. 104
With all due respect, the phrase "[i]t will certainly not be denied" is an
unconvincing argument even when it is printed in the pages of the United
States Reports. The plaintiff certainly denied it, and the force of reason
seems entirely on the plaintiffs side. The authorities in California could
not possibly have known on May 30, 1848 that their legal authority had just
105
vanished, but, as the saying goes, ignorance of the law is no excuse,
And, in any event, ignorance of the law cannot create a valid tariff statute;
only Congress and the President can do so pursuant to Article I.
The correct analysis of the law may well expose persons like Harrison
to liability that they could not reasonably avoid. Congress, however, could
easily have saved the day by passing contingent legislation for the governance of California that took effect immediately upon ratification of the
peace treaty, and the President and Senate could have made any constitutionally necessary appointments at the same time. Because the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to territorial legislation, 10 6 the statute could
have been a simple authorization to the President to maintain the existing
institutions of governance along with proper civilian appointments to the
necessary offices.' 07 Such a statute could have operated from the moment
of its enactment, even if it took months for news of the statute to reach California. And because the private law liability of government officials depended on actual authorization rather than the officials' belief (or lack of
belief) in authorization, this straightforward statutory solution would have
neatly dealt with the myriad legal problems posed by the end of the authority for the war government.
The officials in California clearly anticipated such a congressional response. In his August 7, 1848 announcement of the peace treaty to the people of California, Colonel/Governor Mason declared:
I4Id. at 190-91 (emphasis added).

los As is often true of sayings, this one conceals some important subtleties. For an illuminating dis-

cussion of some of these subtleties, see Gerald Leonard, Rape, Murder, and Formalism: What Happens
if We Define Mistake of Law? (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
106 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
307 There is no constitutional reason why a military officer cannot also hold a civilian appointment.
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The Congress of the United States (to whom alone this power belongs)
will soon confer upon the people of this country the constitutional rights of
citizens of the United States; and, no doubt, in a few short months we shall
have a regularly organized territorial government: indeed, there is every reason to believe that Congress has alreadypassed the act, and that a civil government is now on its way to this country,
to replace that which has been
08
organizedunder the right of conquest.1

Mason further declared that until there was firm word about congressional action, "the present civil officers of the country will continue in the
exercise of their functions as heretofore ... ,,109 Had Congress passed the
appropriate kind of legislation, Mason's actions would have been lawful
even if he did not know it.
Congress, however, did not oblige. The reasons for Congress's inaction are not mysterious: the issue of slavery in California so deadlocked the
Congress that it could not reach agreement on any legislation for the territory.
Regardless of the reason, however, the fact remains that the military authorities in California had no statutory authorization for their postwar governance. What, then, if anything, sustained the actions of the military officials after their wartime authority ran out?
Perhaps one can construct an argument that will salvage the Court's
holding at least With respect to the time period running into early August
1848. Here is the best that we can do: The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
made no provision for the removal of Mexican soldiers from American soil
because the war was rather one-sided. That does not mean, however, that
no Mexican soldiers remained on the territory that was transferred as part of
the peace treaty. Surely some small number of soldiers remained "behind
the lines" even while American troops pressed into the Mexican mainland.
We know that about two thousand Mexican nationals who resided in the
ceded territories ultimately chose to return to Mexico'"'-the prospect of
United States citizenship and potential riches from gold notwithstanding. It
is natural to assume, therefore, that some portion of the indigenous California population posed a military threat to the American forces.
The Constitution makes the President "Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States."' " 2 This is the domestic constitutional
source of power for the operation of a military government. Perhaps one
108 Proclamation of RB. Mason to the People of California (Aug. 7, 1848), reprinted in S. DoC.
No. 31-18, supranote 12, at 566 (emphasis added).
109 Id.
I10 See Saunders, supranote 23, at 456. On the role ofslavery generally in debates over termtonal
governance, see RICHARD WHITE, "IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN": A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN WEST 155-60 (1991).
I See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Language, Rights, and New Mexico Statehood (2001)). available at http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepagesfJWCRAWFORD/nm-con.htm (last visited Ozt. 20.

2000).
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could argue that, even though the international law consequences of a state
of war ended with respect to California upon the exchange of ratifications
and the cession of territory, the constitutional wartime powers of the President continued for some time even after the treaty became official and the
international dispute was formally over. In other words, one can argue that
the constitutional grant of power to the President carries a "penumbral
force" that takes effect as a matter of domestic law once the cession of territory terminates any presidential authority that derives from the existence of
war. This argument does not require any assertion of a generalized executive power to deal with perceived crises. The commander-in-chief power in
this case was properly called into play by the formal existence of a war; the
question is when the full legal force of that war power expires. Is it absurd
to suggest that that power continues, as a matter of domestic constitutional
law, for some period of time after the peace treaty has taken effect, at least
long enough to ensure the public safety? If not, the next step is to determine how long after the formal entry of peace the effects of the presidential
war power continue to linger. A plausible candidate would be: until a reasonable time has passed for notice of the formal peace to reach all of the potential combatants.
This is not an argument that the California government was a legitimate de facto government. This is a claim for de jure authority, as a matter
of domestic constitutional law, based on an asserted temporal relationship
between physical events and constitutional authority. Under this line of argument, the de jure authority of Governor Mason and his tax collectors to
impose military exactions would run until notice of the peace should reasonably have reached California. The actual period of notice was evidently
two months, and from what we have gathered, that was not an unreasonable
amount of time in 1848 for a message to travel from Queretaro, Mexico to
Monterey, California." 3 Thus, let us assume for the moment that August 7,
1848--the date of Mason's announcement of the peace treaty to the people
of California-was the constitutionally appropriate time for notice. On that
date, the war tariff, even on the most generous assumptions that one can
muster, was on its last legs.
Colonel Mason evidently agreed with this assessment, for on August 9,
1848, H.W. Halleck, the Secretary of State in Mason's military government, ,14 wrote to the San Francisco (military) customs collector that "the
tariff of duties for the collection of military contributions will immediately
cease ...."
115 If we assume that our penumbral presidential power implicitly allows some time for the news of peace to disseminate once it reaches
113See supra note 85.
114 Halleck, incidentally, went on to become President Lincoln's chief of staff during part of the Civil
War, and he published a major treatise on international law. See Saunders, supra note 4, at 492 n.23.
115Letter from H.W. Halleck to Captain J.L. Folsum (Aug. 9, 1848), reprinted in S.DOc. No. 3118, supra note 12, at 632.
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the California government perhaps we can validate the military tariffs up to
August 9, 1848. After that point, however, ingenuity is exhausted and the
war tariffs are finished.
Obviously, although this argument is more persuasive than the Supreme Court's ipse dixit, we do not think it is successful. The President, no
less than Congress, can exercise only those powers granted to him or her by
the Constitution. The doctrine of enumerated powers applies to all of the
institutions of the national government. The President's enumerated powers are, in some respects, more general than Congress's: while Congress is
granted only those "legislative Powers herein granted,"' "1 6 the President is
vested with "[t]he Executive Power""17 and the power of "Commander in
Chief."' "1 8 But a general power is not an unlimited power. 19 The power to
impose and maintain a military government is not a small matter. However
broadly one might construe "[t]he Executive Power," it surely does not
stretch that far.' 0 The President's war power as commander-in-chief does
include such a power, but the whole problem in Cross is that the war power
formally ceased to be a source of authority on May 30, 1848. And that
formal cessation is the end of the matter. Constitutional powers operate
from the moment of their effectiveness. Their operation is not delayed
while news of their effectiveness travels the world-just as statutes take effect, unless Congress says otherwise, from the moment of enactment, not
from the moment when knowledge of that enactment reaches the public.
The central premise of this "penumbral" argument is simply false., The
President and Senate could, in principle, "preserve" the President's war
power for some period of time by drafting the treaty to delay the transfer of
sovereignty over California, but that was not done. Authority for the military tariffs ended on May 30, 1848.
In any event, at the absolute maximum, under the most generous assumptions, that authority expired on August 9, 1848. Even the officials in
California agreed that the war tariff must end once they were given notification of the peace treaty. And even the Supreme Court did not contend that
the legitimacy of the war tariff "will certainly not be denied" after that date.
1.
116 U.S. CONST. art I, § 1, cl.
117 Id. art. II, § 1, cl.1.Some scholars deny that this "vesting clause" is a grant of power at all, but
the evidence to the contrary is overwhelming. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses As Power
Grants, 88 Nw.U. L. REv. 1377 (1994).
118 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl.
1.
119 See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, Tihe Erecutive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REv. 1267, 1282-84 (1996).
120 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Powerof the Presidency,93 COLUM. L REV.
1 (1993) (defending a minimalist understanding of"[t]he Executive Power"). Even if Professor Mona-

ghan's conception of the executive power is too stingy, one would need to go very far in order to justify
the kind of presidential authority necessary to make the "penumbral" argument work.
121It would take a separate article to establish this proposition. Fortunately, we have written it. See
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 96.
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For the period beginning May 30, 1848, the military government's authority

cannot be sustained even by the most elastic reading of the Constitution's
war powers. How could Cross, Hobson & Co. possibly lose with respect to
tariffs collected after August 9, 1848?
D. August 9, 1848-November 13, 1849: The War Is in the
History Books
The end of the military tariffs in California on August 9, 1848 did not
mean the end of all tariffs. In the same breath in which he instructed the
San Francisco customs collector to end the military tariff, Secretary of State
Halleck added that "the revenue laws and tariff of the United States will be
substituted in its place."' 22 Cross, Hobson & Co. sought return of all monies
paid through November 13, 1849, when a civilian collector was constitutionally appointed to administer the tariff laws at the congressionally-established
collection district in San Francisco. War powers will not sustain any exactions after May 30, 1848, or at the very latest after August 9, 1848. What
happened after that date that could possibly justify the actions of the military
government? If not from the war powers, then from where did Colonel Mason and Collector Harrison get the authority to take money from the plaintiff?
1. Did Two Wrongs Make a Constitutional Right (At Least Until
March 3, 1849)? One argument that would largely avoid the need to address broad constitutional issues for at least part of the post-war time period
should be dealt with right away. Congress did not designate San Francisco
as a collection district--that is, as a port in which imports may lawfully be
landed upon proper payment of duties-until March 3, 1849. The plaintiff
argued that in the absence of such a designation, there was no federal authority to collect duties. Strictly speaking, that may have been true, but the
argument had a serious potential boomerang effect against the plaintiff. A
collection district is simply a congressionally designated port of entry. The
specification of certain ports as collection districts reflects a corresponding
congressional determination that goods may not lawfully be imported into
the United States at any other place. Accordingly, the real consequence of
the failure to make San Francisco a collection district until March 3, 1849
was that, until that date, it was flatly unlawful for the plaintiff to bring any
goods into the United States through that port, with or without the payment
of any "duties" to Harrison.
Should that have saved Harrison from liability, at least until March 3,
1849? The Court intimated that it might, 23 but that argument is clearly
wrong. The absence of legislation making San Francisco a collection dis122 Letter from H.W.Halleck, Lieutenant, to Captain J.L. Folsum, supra note 20, reprinted hiS.Doc.
No. 31-18,supra note 12, at 568.
123See Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 192 (1854).
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trict meant that Harrison, or other federal authorities, might have been
within their fights to refuse to allow the plaintiff to land its goods-not in
their capacities as officials of California but as officers of the United States
enforcing federal statutory law. 124 It did not mean that the officers could allow the plaintiff to land goods in return for the payment of something that
they labeled a "duty." Suppose that Congress authorizes operation of a gift
shop in the Capitol building that sells miniature replicas of the Capitol. Tourists can leave with a replica if they pay the clerk at the desk ten dollars. If
someone filches a replica and is caught outside by an officer of the Capitol
police, it would not be proper for the officer to say, "Give me the ten dollars
and go on your way," even if the officer then turned the money over to the
clerk. It simply is not the officer's job to collect money for replicas, though it
certainly is the officer's job to arrest shoplifters. In Cross, Harrison might
have been able to tell the plaintiff, "Go land your goods at a designated port
of entry or suffer the consequences of a violation of the customs laws," which
would have been forfeiture of the offending ships and goods.12 But Harrison
did not have the legal right to permit the goods to land in return for payment
of a sum equal to what would have been required under federal tariff law.
The officials in California were very well aware of the true state of the
law concerning entry of goods into California. On February 9, 1849, Harrison wrote to Secretary of State Halleck requesting guidance on how to handle ships that entered San Francisco. (Less than a month later, Congress
would declare San Francisco a collection district, but Harrison and Halleck
had no way to know this-and probably did not find out about the designation until the summer or fall of 1849.) On February 24, 1849, Halleck provided the following assessment of the situation:
In the instructions just received from Washington, it is assumed that, by
the treaty of peace with Mexico, California has become a part of the Union;
that the constitution of the United States is extended over this Territory, and is
in full force throughout its limits.
The position of California, in her commercial relations, both with respect
to foreign countries and to other parts of the Union is, therefore, the same as
that of any other portion of the territory of the United States. There, however,
being as yet no collection districts established by Congress in California, no
foreign dutiable goods can be introduced here. Vessels having on board dutiable goods which they wish to land in California, must enter them in some
regular port of entry of the United States, and there pay the duties prescribed
by law. Any such vessels presenting themselves in a port of California, without having so entered their dutiable goods, ought properly to be warned away
and refused admission; and when the goods are entered at a regular custom-

124 This raises serious

questions about the authority of United States military personnel to enforce

federal civilian law, but let us assume that Harrison could have somehow finagled that one.
125See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch.22, §§ 27-28, 1 Stat. 627, 648.
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house, they can be brought here only in American26bottoms. Such is the course
1
required by a strict interpretation of the law ....
Halleck's analysis conforms precisely to the clear state of the law as
we describe it above. His letter to Harrison, however, continues with the
following remarkable passage:
[B]ut, as this [strict interpretation of the law] would subject such vessels to
great inconvenience and expense, the authorities having charge of this matter
have resolved to present to them the following alternative: To pay here all duties andfees, and to execute allpapers prescribed by the revenue laws
27 of the

United States; and, upon their doing so, their goods will be admitted.'

The "authorities having charge of this matter" were, of course, the
military officers in California. Indeed, the architect of this makeshift customs scheme appears to have been Brevet Major General Persifor F. Smith,
who informed the Army's Adjutant General on April 5, 1849 that he:
thought it proper that the parties should be allowed to deposite [sic] the
amount of duties and land the goods; but, lest this should be construed as giving them a right for the future, and as the President may think proper to put an
end even to this indulgence, I have addressed
28 a circular to all our consuls on
these seas, warning them of this possibility.
This "indulgence" may have been very generous to shippers like Cross,
Hobson & Co., who otherwise would have had to enter their goods in ports
on the Atlantic side of the continent, with no Panama Canal to ease the
journey, and it may have been very important to Californians who badly
needed the goods, t29 but that does not make it lawful. And without any such
126 Letter from H.W. Halleck, Brevet Captain, to E.H. Harrison, U.S. Customs Collector (Feb. 24,

1849), reprintedin S.Doc. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 670-71.
127 Id. at 671.

128Letter from Persifor F. Smith, Brevet Major General, to R. Jones, Brigadier General (Apr. 5,
1849), reprintedin S. Doc. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 694.
129The need for imports into California was so great that the authorities permitted
(upon the payment of"duties") entry of goods from foreign-owned ships, which was forbidden by the general customs
laws. As the commander-in-chief of the Pacific naval forces explained to Collier upon his arrival in San
Francisco:
Mr. Harrison, your predecessor, will doubtless make you fully acquainted with all that has
been done by the naval and military commanders on this station for the collection of duties, and for
the relief of the suffering community, whose wants and necessities were of that urgent nature as to
compel the ruling authorities to adopt their measures to meet the urgent wants of the in-pouring
emigrants, rather than strict obedience to legislative enactment ....
Letter from Thomas AP C. Jones, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces, to J. Collier, U.S. Customs Collector (Nov. 12, 1849), reprintedin S. Doc. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 34. Collier ended the
practice upon taking office:
Iam aware also of the necessity which seemed to justify the exercise of that discretion, It
must be admitted, however, that it was in violation of the revenue laws.
I should exceedingly regret that the strict enforcement of those laws should inflict injury
upon any portion of my countrymen; but I am not vested with discretionarypowers upon such subjects .... [W]hile I may lament that any portion of our countrymen who are engaged in the min-
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authority, the sums collected by Harrison should have been returned to the
plainfiffl3 -- unless Harrison, Mason, Halleck, Smith, and other military personnel in California had authority to take the money as officials of the territorial government of California.
2. The Legal Effect of a Collection District Without a Collector:
March 3, 1849-November 13, 1849. The plaintiff regarded enactment of
the March 3, 1849 statute that made San Francisco a collection district as a
major event. In fact, however, until Collier, the properly appointed collector, assumed the duties of his office on November 13, 1849, the statute
changed nothing. A collection district is a place in which dutiable goods
may be landed upon the properpayment of duties to (and thefiling of appropriate documents with) the proper authorities. Harrison's "appointment" as customs collector rested solely on his appointment by "Governor"
Mason, whose status as governor depended throughout his tenure on the validity of the military government. If that government's authority cannot be
sustained as a matter of federal constitutional law, the plaintiff should have
been entitled to reimbursement.
This brings us to the main event: the Court's validation of the military
government's actions throughout its period of operation. The answers provided by the Court and the Executive Department to the questions arising
from the governance of California represent some of the most astounding
assertions of constitutional power ever advanced.
3. The Court Speaks. The Supreme Court validated the acts of the
military government throughout its period of operation' 3' in one critical
paragraph, which reads in full:
[Mason's] position was unlike any thing that had preceded it in the history of
our country. The view taken of it by himself has been given in the statement
in the beginning of this opinion. It was not without its difficulties, both as regards the principle upon which he should act, and the actual state of affairs in
California. He knew that the Mexican inhabitants of it had been remitted by
ing district should feel the effects in the increased price of provisions, we have, on the other hand,
the satisfaction of knowing that another class, that of the American ship-builders and ship-owners,

will enjoy that protection which the law intended to give them, that the great interest of our own
commerce will be promoted, and that the law of the land is respected and maintained.

See Letter from J. Collier, U.S. Customs Collector, to Thomas AP C. Jones, Commander-in-Chiefof US.
Naval Forces (Nov. 15, 1849), reprintedin S. DOC.No.31-18,supra note 12, at 35.
130 Of course, the plaintiffs ships that were involved in the illegal landing of goods would have

been subject to forfeiture as well. The lack of authorization cuts in both directions. If Harrison did not
have the power to collect customs duties, he also did not have the power to make legal an other ise illegal entry of goods into San Francisco. But that would be a separate case that had no proper bearing on
the disposition of the plaintiff's simple assumpsit action.
131Technically, the case concerned only the period until November 13, 1849. From that point forward,
there was valid legal authority for the collection of tariffs. The Court's argument, however, clearly sustains
the validity of all of the military government's actions until the moment ofstatehood on September 9, 1850.
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the treaty of peace to those municipal laws and usages which prevailed among
them before the territory had been ceded to the United States, but that a state of
things and population had grown up during the war, and after the treaty of
peace, which made some other authority necessary to maintain the rights of the
ceded inhabitants and of immigrants, from misrule and violence. He may not
have comprehended fully the principle applicable to what he might rightly do
in such a case, but he felt rightly, and acted accordingly. He determined, in the
absence of all instruction, to maintain the existing government. The territory
had been ceded as a conquest, and was to be preserved and governed as such
until the sovereignty to which it had passed had legislated for it. That sovereignty was the United States, under the Constitution, by which power had been
given to Congress to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, with the
power also to admit new States into this Union, with only such limitations as
are expressed in the section in which this power is given. The government, of
which Colonel Mason was the executive, had its origin in the lawful exercise
of a belligerent right over a conquered territory. It had been instituted during
the war by the command of the President of the United States. It was the government when the territory was ceded as a conquest, and it did not cease, as a
matter of course, or as a necessary consequence of the restoration of peace.
The Presidentmight have dissolved it by withdrawing the army and navy officers who administered it, but he did not do so. Congress could have put an
end to it, but that was not done. The right inferencefrom the inaction of both
is, that it was meant to be continued until it had been legislatively changed.

No presumption of a contrary intention can be made. Whatever may have
been the causes of delay, it must be presumed that the delay was consistent
with the true policy of the government. And the more so as it was continued
until the people of the territory met in convention to form a State government,
which was subsequently recognized by Congress under its power to admit new
States into the Union. M
Therefore, said the Court:
the civil government of California, organized as it was from a right of conquest, did not cease or become defunct in consequence of the signature of the
treaty or from its ratification. We think it was continued over a ceded conquest, without any violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and that until Congress legislated for it, the duties upon foreign goods imported into San Francisco were legally demanded and lawfully received by Mr.
133
Harrison ....
In other words, as long as the President and Congress do not affirmatively stop an illegal act, their inaction will be considered valid legal ratification. At its narrowest, the Court's reasoning is that wartime powers carry
over into peacetime as long as the President and Congress do not affirmatively end them. This is an absurd warping of the constitutional scheme of
132Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 193-94 (1854).
r33Id. at 195.
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limited government. Constitutionally, the President is a nonplayer in this
story after May 30, 1848 (or at the very latest after August 9, 1848), except
in his or her legislative role under Article I, section 7.1 As the Court itself
observes, Congress has the exclusive power of territorial governance during
peacetime, so the President's failure to order the troops home is constitutionally irrelevant. As for Congress, it did nothing. This is not even a case
of purported legislative ratification of the misconstruction of a statute through
a failure to amend, which is enough of a stretch in its own right. Here there
was no statute to fail to amend. There was no statute at all. Congress never
took any action with respect to the governance of California beyond making
San Francisco a collection district, which has nothing to do with the internal
governance of the territory. Congress may well have wanted or intended to
keep the military government in force, but its collective wishes are not a
constitutional substitute for a statute. Congress cannot exercise its Article
IV powers of governance by having hopes and wishes, holding a seance, or
anything else short of enacting a statute. Congress's Article IV power is a
legislative power that must be exercised in accordance with Article I's
lawmaking procedures, including presentment to the President.
All in all, the Court probably would have been better off simply to say,
"It cannot be denied that...."
4. Cross's Theory in Practice. The Court's validation of the government in Cross has important ramifications. Military governments of occupied territory during wartime operate in accordance with the laws of war.
They need not comply with the procedural forms for governmental action
prescribed in the Constitution; the courts that they establish during wartime
need not conform to the dictates of Article III; and the Bill of Rights does
not, for instance, require soldiers in occupied territory to get warrants before they search houses for insurgents. There are, of course, limits to the
powers of military governments. As the Court held just two years before
35
Cross in Mitchell v. Harmony,1
military officials cannot seize private
property, even during wartime, unless they can demonstrate that such seizure is in fact necessary; and (in an era before modem immunity doctrines)
the officers will be held personally liable for such seizures if a jury subsequently finds that the action was not justified by military necessity. But these
limits are far from the limits imposed on civilian government by the Constitution. What happens if one of these wartime governments acquires, through
judicial grace, some kind of legitimate existence after the war is over and the
134See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
2 (describing the presentment requirement and veto power). The
President can, of course, also recommend to Congress "such Measures as he shall judge necessary and

expedient," id. at art. II, § 3, and if Congress is out of session when fast action is necessary, the President can "convene both Houses, or either of them." Id. But none of this gives the President the power
to construct a military government during peacetime.
13554 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1852).
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occupied territory has been ceded to the United States? Does the ongoing
military government retain all of the powers that it had during the war?
If the answer is no, then one has the unwelcome task of determining
exactly which constitutional restrictions do and do not bind wartime govemments that somehow extend into peacetime. Although Cross has never
been taken as far as its reasoning might permit, it has had enough precedential force to make the Supreme Court face some of these questions.
The Insular Cases were a series of decisions, spanning the first quarter
of the twentieth century, that dealt with the aftermath of yet another American war of territorial acquisition: the Spanish-American War. 136 That war
ended in a treaty of peace whose ratifications were exchanged on April 11,
1899. The treaty ceded to the United States a number of island territories,
including the Philippines and Puerto Rico. In the case of Puerto Rico, Congress enacted a statute providing for a civil government for the territory on
April 12, 1900, with an effective date of May 1, 1900. For more than a
year, therefore, Puerto Rico was an American possession without a statu-

tory government. As happened in California in 1848, the American military
government continued in operation until it was displaced by the statutory

civilian authorities. And as happened in California, one of the military
government's principal functions was to collect duties on goods imported
into Puerto Rico. There was no question that the government had such
power until the exchange of ratifications that formally ended the war with

Spain, including the power to impose military exactions on goods imported
into Puerto Rico from the continental United States. But what happened after Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States?
The Court addressed this question in Dooley v. United States.137 After
the ratification of the peace treaty, the military government continued to
collect exactions on goods imported to Puerto Rico, including goods imported from the continental United States. The Court held, on the authority
of Cross, that the military government validly continued in operation until
the congressionally-created civilian government took over on May 1,

1900.138 But the Court further held that that authority did not include the
136Technically, the Insular TariffCases was the name given by the Supreme Court to a series of
decisions in 1901 that dealt with the tariffstatus of the new territories acquired by the United States as a
result of that war. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 2 (1901). For convenience, however, we use the
term The Insular Cases to refer to the range of decisions, effectively ending in 1922 with Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), that discussed the applicability of various constitutional restrictions to
the extracontinental "insular" territories. For an excellent and readable discussion of The Insular Cases,
see OWEN M. Fiss, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 225-56 (1993).
137182 U.S. 222 (1901).
138 The Court's entire discussion of this point was: "We have no doubt, however, that, from the necessities of the case, the right to administer the government of Porto Rico continued in the military
commander after the ratification of the treaty, and until further action by Congress. Cross v. Harrison,
above cited." Id. at 234.
Incidentally, the spelling of"Porto Rico" in this passage is not a misprint. That was the official spelling
until it was changed by Congress to "Puerto Rico" in 1932. See Lawson, supra note 4, at 869 n.85.
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power to impose exactions, in the guise of tariffs or otherwise, on goods
imported from the United States. While the power of a military commander, said the Court, "is necessarily despotic, this must be understood
rather in an administrative than in a legislative sense. While in legislating
for a conquered country he may disregard the laws of that country, he is not
wholly above the laws of his own."'' 9 The powers of a military government, said the Court, extend only to "the necessities of the case,"141 and in
the Court's judgment those necessities did not include the need for tariffs
on imported American goods. Thus, "the authority of the President as
Commander-in-Chief to exact duties upon imports from the United States
ceased with the ratification of the treaty of peace .... 41
The Court's reasoning is, to say the least, obscure. At one point, the
Court seems to infer the absence of presidential power from "the spirit as well
as the letter of the tariff laws,"'142 though because those laws are not the
source of the power to impose military exactions, it is not clear why they are
relevant. At another point, the Court indicates that a tariff on American imports "might have placed Porto Rico in a most embarrassing situation"'143 by
damaging its economy, which may well have been true but seems like an odd
basis for a constitutional limitation on the presidential war power. The remark that military governments are not always "above the laws" of their own
countries is not explained; the rule that private rights can be infringed only if
necessary is a principle of the law of war that needs no additional support in
domestic law. Dooley provides little guidance about the extent to which
peace limits what would otherwise be the powers of military government.
The Court further elaborated on the peacetime powers of military governments in Santiago v. Nogueras.'" The case again concerned the period
in Puerto Rico between the cession to the United States on April 11, 1899
and the establishment of a civilian government on May 1, 1900. On June
27, 1899, the military authorities created the United States Provisional
Court. The court's stated purpose was to deal with an increasing stream of
business "that does not fall within the jurisdiction of the local insular
courts,"' 45 but the court's jurisdiction was quite broad. The plaintiffs' land
was sold to execute a judgment issued by the Provisional Court and was
eventually acquired by the defendant. The plaintiffs sought recovery of the
land on the ground that the provisional court was a legal nullity and had no
power to enter the judgment for which the land was sold. The court had no
trouble upholding the validity of the provisional Court. The military gov139 Dooley, 182 U.S. at 234.
140 Id.

141Id. at 236.
142Id.at 234.
143 Id.at 235-36.
144 214 U.S. 260 (1909).
145 Id.at 264 (internal citations omitted).
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ernment was valid on the authority of Cross,146 and such a government
clearly had the power to create courts. 147 The Court intriguingly observed,
however, that "[t]he authority of a military government during the period
between the cession and the action of Congress, like the authority of the
same government before the cession, is of large, though it may not be of

unlimited, extent."' 48 The suggestion here, though it is not absolutely entailed by the statement, is that there is not much difference between a peacetime military government and a wartime military government, though
Dooley precluded a holding that there were no differences at all. Because
the establishment of courts was an easy case, the Court did not need to
plumb the limits of this authority.
These cases, of course, dealt only with the "interregnum"' 149 between
cession and the establishment of a civil government. Most of The Insular
Cases dealt with the extent to which Congress's Article IV powers to govern territories are limited by the Constitution, and especially by the Bill of
Rights provisions dealing with civil and criminal procedure. The Court's
ultimate conclusion in those cases, which is still the law today, was even
more bizarre, or at least more convoluted, than its resolution of Cross.
With respect to territories that are fully "incorporated" into the United
States, all provisions of the Constitution are immediately applicable of their
own force, but with respect to territories that are not "incorporated" into the
United States--meaning essentially that they are not regarded as near-term
candidates for statehood-only "fundamental" constitutional provisions apply of their own force. 150 Nonfundamental provisions, which under this dichotomy include the rights to grand and petit criminal juries, 151 apply only
if Congress so directs.
There is a torrent of academic criticism of The Insular Cases152 (to
which one of us has contributed a few droplets' 53), but a few words here
will be sufficient. The Constitution clearly contemplates a difference between the powers of the national government over people in the territories
and in the states; the federal government has a general legislative power
over the territories that is not limited to the subject matters enumerated in
146 Id.
at 265.
147Id. at 266.
148 Id.
149fad.
at 265.

150See Lawson, supra note 4, at 873-74.
151See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (holding that there is no constitutional right to
petit jury in unincorporated territories); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914) (holding that there
is no constitutional right to indictment by grand jury in unincorporated territories).
152 See, e.g.,
Neuman, supra note 4; Ramos, supra note 4; Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States,
Incorporation Doctrine: Reaching a Century of Constitutional AuthoriPuerto Rico, and the Territorial
tarianism,31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 55 (1997).
153See Gary Lawson, The Bill
of Rights as an Exclamation Point,33 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 518-19
(1999) (book review) [hereinafter Lawson, Bill ofRights]; Lawson, supra note 4, at 870-76.
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Article I. It is possible that the scope of this general legislative power
might be somewhat different in various territorial settings. 154There are also
potential differences between the constitutional power of the national government over territories before and after ratification of the Bill of Rights. 55
There is even a case to be made that federal power over territories in which
the United States is the only sovereign is different than federal power over
national enclaves within states, where the state and federal governments are
potentially overlapping sovereigns. 56 And it may even be the case that
there are some kinds of territories that the United States simply does not
have the constitutional power to acquire. 5 7 But there is nothing in the Constitution that suggests that express constitutional limitations on national
power apply differently to different territories once that territory is properly
acquired. Nor is there anything in the Constitution that marks out certain
categories of rights or powers as more or less "fundamental" than others-much less that rights to jury trial would fall on the "nonfundamental"
side of the ledger.'t5 - The doctrine of "territorial incorporation" that
emerged from The Insular Cases is transparently an invention designed to
facilitate the felt needs of a particular moment in American history. Felt
needs generally make bad law, and The Insular Cases are no exception.
A detailed critique of The Insular Cases is beyond our present project.
The salient point to extract is that Cross has served as a precedent for upholding actions by other military governments in peacetime. More generally, perhaps Cross helped pave the way for The Insular Cases by
validating the notion of a peacetime government that did not operate under
the full range of norms required by the Constitution. In either case, it represents an assertion of national power that has frightening implications.
5. The Executive Speaks. If the Supreme Court's assertion of national power to maintain a peacetime military government seems extravagant, it is nothing compared to the claim of power advanced by the
executive arm of the United States government.
154 The District Clause gives Congress the power of "exclusive Legislation" over the District and

federal enclaves, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2, while the Territories Clause gives Congress the power
to enact "needful Rules and Regulations" concerning territories, U.S. CONsr. ar. I, § 8, cl.17. If the
word "needful" limits the scope of Congress's general legislative jurisdiction, then Congress might have
broader power over the District and federal enclaves than it has over territories, and what counts as a
"needful" regulation could vary from one territory to another depending on local circumstances.
155See Lawson, Bill ofRights, supra note 153, at 516-18.
156 See David E. Engdahl, State and FederalPower over FederalProperty, 18 ARIZ. L REV. 283

(1976).
157Can the United States acquire territory that is never intended for statehood? The question %was
raised at the end of the nineteenth century and is more serious than it may first appear. But that is a
topic for a separate article.
158For an analysis of the fundamental (by any understanding of that term) role ofjuries in the American constitutional order, see AXHIL REED Am1AR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATtoN AND RECO.sThUCT1ON

81-118 (1998).

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Colonel/Governor Mason was several months' distant from Washington, D.C. When he received news of the ratification of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in August 1848, he had no instructions from anyone
concerning the governance of California. He had no way to know whether
Congress had passed any statutes, or whether those statutes authorized him
or deprived him of authority to govern. Under the rule of Little v. Barreme,
that meant that Mason simply had to make his best guess and live with the
consequences. He chose to continue to govern, but with no illusions about
his formal legal authority:
I am fully aware that, in taking these steps [to continue the government
and collect import duties], I have no further authority than that the existing
government must necessarily continue until some other is organized to take its
place, for I have been left without any definite instructions in reference to the
existing state of affairs. But the calamities and disorders which would surely
follow the absolute withdrawal of even a show of authority, impose on me, in
my opinion, the imperative duty to pursue the course I have indicated, until the
arrival of despatches from Washington (which I hope are already
on their way)
59
relative to the organization of a regular civil government.1
That letter could be read as a plea from Mason for Congress to bail him
out from any problems that his decision may cause in the future. (The Supreme Court's decision in Cross, of course, obviated any need for a private
bill h la Captain Little.) The executive department in Washington, D.C.,
however, took a different view of Mason's authority. On October 7, 1848,
Secretary of State James Buchanan wrote an astonishing letter concerning
the governance of California and New Mexico. Buchanan acknowledged
that "[b]y the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, the military government
which was established over [the people of California] under the laws of
war, as recognized by the practice of all civilized nations, has ceased to derive its authority from this source of power."' 160 Buchanan continued, however, by reasoning:
But is there, for this reason, no government in California? Are life, liberty, and property under the protection of no existing authorities? This would
be a singular phenomenon in the face of the world, and especially among
American citizens, distinguished as they are above all other people for their
law-abiding character. Fortunately, they are not reduced to this sad condition.
The termination of the war left an existing government, a government de facto,
in full operation, and this will continue, with the presumed consent of the people, until Congress shall provide for them a territorial government. The great
law of necessity justifies this conclusion. The consent of the people is irresistibly inferred from the fact that no civilized community could possibly de159Letter of R.B. Mason, Colonel, to R. Jones, Adjutant General (Aug. 19, 1848), reprinted in S.
Doc. No. 18, supra note 12, at 574.
160Letter from James Buchanan, Secretary of State, to William V. Vorhies (Oct. 7, 1848), reprinted
in S.DOC. No. 18, supra note 12, at 7.
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sire to abrogate an existing government, when the alternative presented would
be to place themselves in a state of anarchy, beyond the protection of all laws,
and reduce them to the unhappy necessity of submitting to the dominion of the
strongest.161

Buchanan added that "[t]his government de facto vill, of course, exercise no power inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States, which is the supreme law of the land,"' 162 and that accordingly:
[N]o import duties can be levied in California on articles the growth, produce,
or manufacture of the United States, as no such duties can be imposed in any
other part of our Union on the productions of California. Nor can new duties
be charged in California upon such foreign productions as have already paid
duties in any of our ports of entry, for the
obvious reason that California is
3
within the territory of the United States.16
President Polk expressly endorsed the substance of Mr. Buchanan's
analysis in his state of the union message of December 5, 1848:
The inhabitants [of California], by the transfer of their country, had become entitled to the benefits of our laws and Constitution, and yet were left
without any regularly organized government. Since that time, the very limited
power possessed by the Executive has been exercised to preserve and protect
them from the inevitable consequences of a state of anarchy. The only government which remained was that established by the military authority during
the war. Regarding this to be a defacto government, and that by the presumed
consent of the inhabitants it might be continued temporarily, they were advised
to conform and submit to it for the short intervening period before Congress
would again assemble and could legislate on the subjectLt r
Fairly read, this is a claim, put forward by the President and Secretary of
State, that continuation of the military government in California was affi-matively legal, as a matter of domestic American law, even in the absence of
congressional authorization.165 The claim raises legal and factual issues.

161Id.
162Id.
at 8.
163 Id.

164CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1848).
165It is interesting, in this light, to contrast the statement made on January 23, 1850 by President
Zachary Taylor in response to a Senate resolution asking, inter alia, whether he had appointed anyone as
civil or military governor of California since March 4,1849:
On coming into office, I found the military commandant of the department of California exercising the functions of civil governor in that Territory; and left, as Iwas, to act under the treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, without the aid of any legislative provision establishing a government in
that Territory, I thought it best not to disturb that arrangement, made under my predecessor, until

Congress should take some action on that subject. I therefore did not interfere with the powers of
the military commandant, who continued to exercise the functions of civil governor as before; but I
made no such appointment, conferred no such authority, and have allowed no increased comp.ensation to the commandant for his services.
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a. Madison, Hamilton, Jay... and Hobbes?-Let us assume for the

moment that every sensible person would choose virtually any organized
government over none at all-although many seemingly sensible people,
including one of the present authors, emphatically disagree with this assumption.1 66 What does that mean, as a matter of domestic law, about the
powers of the American national government? Does that mean that there is
constitutional authorization for the establishment of an American military
government anywhere in the world where there is a governmental vacuum?
That the presumed consent of the people living in a state of governmental
interregnum permits the President and military authorities, as a matter of
domestic law, to fill the void? The claim is bizarre enough at the level of
abstract political theory. It is positively clinical in the context of the
American constitutional scheme, under which the national government is an
institution of limited and enumerated powers. Perhaps a Hobbesian sovereign would be able to claim the kind of legal authority that Polk and Buchanan attributed to Colonel Mason (and that Colonel Mason never claimed
for himself167), but neither the United States government nor its territorial
arm in California during 1848 meets that description.
b. A Government By Any Other Name.. .- The American gov-

emment's position is even more bizarre when one reflects on its central assumption: that in the absence of American military rule, there would be
anarchy, in the sense of no functioning institutions of order., 68 When the
United States conquered California during the Mexican-American War, it
did not simply occupy a territory that had no prior human inhabitants. Before the President established a military government in 1847, the people of
California did not live without government. There were plenty of governmental institutions that operated under the sovereignties of Spain and MexS. Doc. NO. 31-18, supra note 12, at 1.
166 There is a large literature defending forms of social organization without government. See, e.g.,
DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: GUIDE TO A RADICAL CAPITALISM (1973); MURRAY

N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO (1978); LINDA TANNEHILL,
MORRIS TANNEHILL & JARRETT WOLLSTEIN, SOCIETY WITHOUT GOVERNMENT (1972).
167 Mason appears from this saga to have been an honest person with no pretensions of grandeur.
Indeed, it is hard to study these events without feeling a great sadness, and some measure of admiration,
for Colonel Mason. His comments after the conclusion of the treaty of peace demonstrate a keen awareness of the precariousness of his legal situation, and his comments during his wartime administration
show a detailed and precise knowledge of the nature of military governance. See Letter of R.B. Mason,
Colonel, to L.W. Boggs, Alcaide (June 2, 1847), reprinted in S. DOC. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 30506 (describing correctly the legal origins and limits of military rule). He took the extraordinary step of
asking to be relieved from his post. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. And when that day finally came, he died shortly after returning home. See Saunders, supra note 4, at 510 n.135.
168 There is a more limited sense of anarchy, in which it simply describes the absence of any government that claims and enforces a legitimate monopoly on the use of force in a given territory. Whether anarchy in this sense necessarily leads (or even tends to lead) to an absence of social order is a basic question of
political theory on which reasonable people disagree. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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ico. Before the American invasion, California "had a well-defined and relatively effective legal structure based largely on customary law and conflict

resolution."' 69 Indeed, as is typical in cases of conquest, the vast majority of
the indigenous laws remained in force after the occupation; only those laws
170

specifically displaced by the military government ceased to be effective.
Had the American military government disappeared on May 30, 1848, or any
later date, the people of California could have fallen back on their pre-

occupation system of government. If those structures proved inadequate to
the changed circumstances of 1848, te1 the prior institutions could have been
adapted or replaced without the intervention of the American military. It is
absurd to suggest that the only alternative to American military rule was

complete lawlessness-unless, of course, the pre-existing Mexican institutions simply did not count, in Mr. Buchanan's eyes, as a government.
This last point suggests a deeper problem with the American government's assertion of power from implied consent. Who, exactly, are the
"people of California" whose consent was being implied? Could Polk and
Buchanan really have believed that the Mexican inhabitants of California,

who had been operating their own institutions of government for some time
before the American military took over, impliedly consented to the continued rule of the occupying forces in preference to the reinstitution of their

own forms of government? This is not even an issue of suffrage, comparable to the kinds of familiar questions that one can raise about the authority

of a constitutional ratification process that permits the participation of only
a fraction of the population.172 This is a question of implied consent. One
can play the game of implied consent 73 independently of any questions of

169 Myra K. Saunders, CaliforniaLegal History: A Review ofSpanish and Uexican Legal Instiu-

tions, 87 LAw LIBR. J. 487, 506 (1996). For a detailed description ofthe Mexican institutions that were
in place in 1846, see id. at 495-504.
170 This was acknowledged by State Department official John Clayton in a letter of April 3, 1849
giving instructions to a presidential agent being sent to California:
The laws of California and New Mexico, as they existed at the conclusion of the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, regulating the relations of the inhabitants with each other, will necessarily remain in force in those Territories. Their relations with their former government have been dissolved, and new relations created between them and the government of the United States; but the
existing laws regulating the relations of the people with each other will continue until others, lawfully enacted, shall supersede them.
Letter from John M. Clayton, State Department Official, to Hon. Thomas Butler King, Appointed Agent
of the U.S. to California (Apr. 3, 1849), reprintedin S. DoC. No. 31-18.supra note 12, at 10.
171 Obviously, there was a much larger American population in California in 1848. Sec infra notes
175-78 and accompanying text. The Mexican legal institutions were less formal than the AngloAmerican institutions, and were therefore unfamiliar and unattractive to American settlers. See Saunders, supranote 169, at 506. But that is a far cry from Hobbesian chaos.
172 See, e.g., Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitutionand Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory
of ConstitutionalInterpretation,58 S. CAL- L. REV. 603 (1985).
173 Implied consent is more a game than a theory. As one of us has written clscwhere, "[t]he problem with tacit consent is that it is almost always about one hundred parts tacit to one part consent."
Gary S. Lawson,An lnterpretivistAgenda,15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 160 n.9 (1992).
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voting rights because the purported
74 authority results from an inference
rather than from an actual election.
Accordingly, if one wants to invoke notions of implied consent, one
needs to identify whose consent is being implied. It is very hard to get a
handle on exactly who was in California during various times in 1848. In
1846, there were probably between 130,000 and 250,000 Native Americans
in California and approximately 10,000 non-natives, 175 of whom about twothirds were Latino. 6 Implied consent to an American military government
in 1846 does not look promising. By 1848, however, matters had changed.
Gold had been discovered in January 1848,177 and people were flocking to
the region, including hordes of white Americans. By the 1850 census, there
were approximately 165,000 residents in California.17 8 What, if anything,
does this mean about the state of affairs in the summer of 1848? That is
hard to say, though it is not at all clear that many of the new immigrants to
California during the gold rush would have preferred the military government to their own private institutions of justice.
But, of course, this is all silly speculation. It is doubtful that President
Polk and Secretary of State Buchanan were engaging in deep political theory when they sought to justify the California military government during
peacetime. No doubt they were simply expressing the "commonsense"
view, implicit in the idea of a de facto government, that one should not lightly
dissolve an existing mechanism for preserving order without a high degree of
confidence that something equivalent or better is about to take its place.
c. Anarchy By Any Other Name.. .- Even on that modest level,
however, the post-war government in California does not fare well. The
gold rush was under way, and among the rushers were many, if not most, of
the soldiers who were supposedly providing order. On August 14, 1848,
less than two months before Secretary of State Buchanan sought to derive
an extraconstitutional power to govern from the imperative need for a military government to maintain order, Captain (and Assistant Quartermaster)
J.L. Folsom described the state of affairs in San Francisco:
The most mortifying state of things prevails here at this time. Government, both civil and military, is abandoned. Offences are committed with impunity; and property, and lives even, are no longer safe .

. .

.

Acts of

disgraceful violence occur almost daily on board the shipping, and we have no
174 For instance, would slaves in 1789 have preferred the Constitution to the Articles of Confedera-

tion? One can ask the question as a matter of normative political theory without implicating any questions concerning the participation of blacks, free or slave, in the actual ratification of the Constitution.
175 See Saunders, supranote 169, at 488.
176 See id.
177 Id.
178 See KENNETH C. MARTIS & GREGORY A. ELMES, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF STATE POWER IN

CONGRESS, 1790-1990, at 58 (1993).
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power to preserve order. Tomorrow morning the volunteers will be mustered
out of service, and
79 we shall be utterly without resource for the protection of
public property. 1
As for what was happening in the rest of the state, we cannot do better
than to quote Colonel Mason, who on November 24, 1848, between Buchanan's and Polk's stirring tributes to the order-preserving power of the
military government reported to his commander:
The war being over, the soldiers nearly all deserted, and having now
been from the States two years, I respectfully request to be ordered home. I
feel the less hesitancy in making this request, as it is the second only that I
recollect ever to have made, in more than thirty years' service, to be relieved
from any duty upon which I have been placed: the first was asking to be relieved from the recruiting
service, in 1832, that I might join my company in
180
the Black Hawk war.
The problem continued into the next year, as was acknowledged by
General Persifor F. Smith, who in a March 6, 1849 letter to Mason, who
was still saddled with the unwanted duty of governing the territory until
April 1849, pointed out that new soldiers "will require some additional inducements beyond their pay to prevent them from deserting."'' The trick
was to "keep them through the mining season"; 182 if that could be done, he
hoped, "they will remain next winter; and in the spring circumstances may
be altered." 83
The order that existed in California during the post-war period was not
the product of the American military government. It was largely the product of private mechanisms for justice that evolved in mining colonies. As
Professor Saunders has observed:
[T]he military government exerted little, if any, control over the mining
camps[.] [T]his effectively created a large number of completely independent
townships functioning entirely under their own sets of rules, but often utilizing
the Spanish-Mexican nomenclature. The local laws developed for protecting
gold mine claims in the California mining camps became the foundation of
United States mining law.'8 4

179 Letter from J.L. Folsom, Captain, to W.T. Sherman, Lieutenant (Aug. 14, 1848), reprintcd in S.
Doc. No. 31-18,supranote 12, at 589.
I Letter from R.B. Mason, Colonel, to R. Jones, Brigadier General (Nov. 24, 1848), reprintedin S.
Doc. No. 31-18,supranote 12, at 625.
181 Letter from Persifor F. Smith, Brevet Major General, to R.B. Mason, Colonel (Mar. 6. 1849),
reprintedin S. DOc. No. 31-18, supra note 12, at 691.
182 Id.
183 Id.

184 Saunders, supranote 4, at 489. For more details on the governance structure of mining colonts
see RODMAN WILSON PAUL, MINING FRONTIERS OF THE FAR WEST, 1848-1880, at 22-25 (1963); Saunders, supra note 4, at 506-09.
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Under Hobbesian assumptions, the sovereign's authority depends upon
its ability to deliver on the promise of order. Even as a Hobbesian constitutional theory, the approach of President Polk and Secretary of State Buchanan
fails to establish the authority of the California territorial government.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is really nothing to be said in favor of the constitutionality of the
post-war California military government. Congress and the President could
have avoided most, if not all, of the problems by the simple expedient of
enacting a statute converting the military government into a genuine Article
IV territorial government, provided that the President and Senate made
whatever appointments and confirmations were necessary to complete the
governmental structure.' 85 But Congress was paralyzed by the debate over
slavery. That, however, is not the Constitution's problem. If congressional
paralysis is really a mandate for disregarding constitutional commands, then
constitutionalism is a bad joke-as it surely was for California from May
30, 1848 until statehood.

185 As an original matter, this would not validate courts that did not conform to the dictates of Article III of the Constitution, see Lawson, supra note 4, at 878-93, but the Supreme Court had already covered
that track in 1828 by declaring (in a case that did not squarely raise the point) that Article IlI did not apply
to territorial tribunals. See American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).

